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Essay 1:
The Real Determinants of Asset Sales
1
Abstract
In this paper I develop a dynamic structural model in which a firm makes rational
decisions to buy or sell assets in the presence of both idiosyncratic and aggregate
productivity shocks. By identifying equilibrium asset prices, the model produces an
industry with a well-defined panel of firms, and jointly analyzes firms’ asset sales
decisions and the aggregate asset sales activity in the business cycle. It suggests
that changes of productivity, rather than levels, affect firms’ decisions - firms with
increasing productivity buy assets while firms with decreasing productivity choose to
downsize. More assets are transacted in expansion years when aggregate productivity
and price for existing assets are higher. The model is calibrated using the plant-level
data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). Using
the simulated panel, I show that most of the empirical evidence on asset sales is
consistent with value-maximizing behavior: (1) firms which buy assets have higher
valuation around the transaction, but lower long-run average — a result that was
previously used to support the market-timing theory; (2) small acquirers have higher
returns during the acquisition year than do large acquirers; and (3) dynamic properties
of productivity shocks affect the asset sales activity in the industry: industries with
less persistent and highly dispersed productivity shocks have greater asset sales.
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1 Introduction
One of the puzzles in corporate finance is why asset sales and merger activities vary
not only across industries, but also over time. Many researchers find similar results:
assets are traded much more frequently in some industries than others; and a greater
number of transactions occur in expansion years when aggregate productivity is high.
But, what makes assets in one industry more likely to change hands than the assets
in others? Why do asset sales coincide with the business cycle? Which firms engage
in asset sales?1
This paper addresses these questions by providing a unified framework that jointly
analyzes firms’ asset sales decisions and asset sales activity in the industry. In my
model, a firm maximizes its value by making two inter-related decisions: how much
to invest in new assets and whether to buy or sell existing assets. These decisions
are made under both firm- and industry-level productivity shocks. By modeling
equilibrium asset prices, I am able to make predictions about an industry with a
well-defined panel of firms. My model shows that most of the empirical evidence
on asset sales is consistent with value-maximizing behavior. Firms optimally expand
or downsize in response to changes in productivity that are driven by shocks. The
model is calibrated using plant-level data from the Longitudinal Research Database
maintained by U.S. Census.
I have four main findings. First, I show that a dynamic neoclassical model with
productivity shocks generates transaction patterns that were previously viewed as
support for the misvaluation theory, as documented by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson,
and Viswanathan (2004). Firms which buy assets have higher valuation around the
transaction, but lower long-run valuation; while firms which sell assets have lower
1In this paper, I use the term ”asset sales” in a loose sense to include both asset sales and
purchases.
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valuation around the transaction, but higher long-run valuation. In my model, this
phenomenon occurs as a result of equilibrium behavior without misvaluation. The
intuition is as follows. Firms choose optimal sizes based on productivity levels. As
productivity changes with shocks, firms with productivity increases will expand while
firms with productivity decreases will downsize. Hence, more productive firms buy
their less productive counterparts (high buys low). In addition, since shocks are
mean reverting, firms are more likely to acquire assets at times when their current
productivity is above the long-run average, and they are more likely to sell assets at
times when current productivity is below the long-run average. As a result, controlling
for current valuations, buyers have lower long-run valuation than do sellers (long-run
low buys long-run high).
Second, this model considers a firm’s decision on asset sales based on both size
and productivity. Thus, it allows me to address recent empirical findings on the size
effect in acquirer returns. Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004),
I find that small acquirers have higher returns around the acquisition than do large
acquirers. When there exist fixed transaction costs, acquisitions are more likely to be
carried out when there is a major increase in productivity and the firm size is large.
Both of these factors lead to a higher payoff in dollar terms. Small acquirers have
a bigger increase in productivity and hence higher returns. Thus, the empirically
observed size effect in acquirer returns is driven by the endogenous sample selection.
Moreover, I show that, in equilibrium, even when input prices fully adjust to
industry-level shocks, the presence of fixed costs can still lead to greater asset sales
in expansion years, when aggregate productivity is high. This is because the gain of
transferring assets increases in industry productivity, and when aggregate productiv-
ity is high, acquisitions are more likely to occur, especially for the marginal buyers
and sellers.
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Finally, my model provides new and testable implications for how the dynamic
properties of productivity shocks explain the cross-industry variation in asset sales.
Since purchases and sales of assets result from changes in productivity due to shocks,
this model predicts that industries in which firms find it more likely to have their
relative productivity change over time have greater asset sales activity.
I consider two main differences in the model between investing in new assets and
buying assets from other firms. First, based on time-to-build models in the economics
literature,2 I assume that it takes one period for new investments to become produc-
tive, while assets bought from other firms are available for production immediately.
Given this difference in availability, decisions on new investments reflect expected fu-
ture demand for capacity, and decisions on asset sales result from the current demand
caused by unexpected changes in productivity. In other words, in my model, firms
make new investments to account for the expected future growth, but participate in
asset sales to fix current investment needs. To account for the empirical findings that
asset sales are infrequent and lumpy, I assume that there exists a fixed cost for buying
and selling assets.
I solve the model in a recursive equilibrium framework using simulations, taking
asset prices and industry evolution as endogenous. I face two numerical challenges.
First, to model the interactions among all firms in the industry, I need to incorpo-
rate industry structure, which is a joint distribution of productivity levels and capital
stocks, into the decision process. But, this joint distribution is a high-dimension ob-
ject and numerical solutions to dynamic programming problems become increasingly
difficult as the size of state space increases. Second, I need to have a pre-specified
pricing function for existing assets, which, when taken by all firms in the industry, can
2The time-to-build attributes in capital investment are illustrated in Kydland and Prescott (1982)
and Christiano and Todd (1996).
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be implied by the optimal decisions of heterogeneous firms in that industry. I follow
the methods developed in Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) for solutions. Through
simulations, I show that using a limited number of moments of the distribution as a
proxy for the entire distribution leads to prices and quantities that are approximately
optimal.
Other papers have also addressed the relationship between shocks and asset sales.
Using a static equilibrium model, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) predict how aggre-
gate demand shocks affect a firm’s growth pattern, based on its productivity. In their
model, firm size is endogenously related to productivity and a positive demand shock
can cause the more productive firms to buy assets from the less productive firms. In
another paper, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) describe a model where decisions to
buy and sell assets are driven by firm-specific contemporaneous productivity.
Although my model does incorporate features from these two models, it differs in
several crucial ways. In my model, firms make dynamic investment decisions, based on
the interaction of size and productivity. Since size also serves as a proxy for previous
productivity, it allows me to consider not only cross-sectional, but also time-series
effects of productivity shocks. By tracking a firm over time, I am able to include
past as well as expected future productivity into current investment decisions. Such
a dynamic setting helps to shed light on some of the puzzles that existing studies
are not able to explain using static models. In addition, the dynamic equilibrium
aspect of this model differs from most of the existing models on asset sales. Here,
the decision of a particular firm depends on the characteristics of other firms in the
industry, and industry structure evolves over time to reflect past productivity levels
and sales activities. Using the simulated panel based on the model, I can also address
questions about how levels of asset sales activity differ across various industries, and
change over the business cycle.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related lit-
erature. Section 3 presents an example of two firms and three periods that illustrate
the basic intuition. Section 4 describes the model and simulation method. Section 5
discusses the model’s implications by using simulated moments, and Section 6 con-
cludes.
2 Related Literature
My research is related to the literature on asset sales, mergers and acquisitions.
The cross-industry difference in asset reallocation has been documented in Mitchell
and Mulherin (1996) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)3. Over time, both asset sales
and merger activities are found to be procyclical: a greater number of mergers take
place and more assets are traded in expansion years when aggregate productivity is
high (Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Eis-
feldt and Rampini (2005)). My theoretical model and empirical results are consistent
with this literature.
Neoclassical theory views mergers and asset sales as efficiency-improving efforts
that happen in response to industry shocks. The hypothesis that merger activities
are driven by broad economic shocks can be traced to Gort (1969). Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002) formalize this idea in a model where firms with higher productivity
acquire firms with lower productivity. Since their model builds on the constant return
to scale technology, it focuses on cross-sectional contemporaneous sales, rather than
on activities over time. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) present an equilibrium model
to show how firms respond differently to aggregate demand shocks based on their
3Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show that seven industries account for more than half of the total
takeover activities in the sample period. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that in manufacturing
industries, the highest annual rate of asset sales is 4.72 percent and the lowest rate is 2.77 percent.
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productivity. The relation between economic shocks and asset reallocation has been
documented in empirical studies, such as Mitchell and Mulherin(1996), Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Andrade and Stafford (2004) and Harford (2005). My
model augments this literature by generating simulated panel data which can be used
to study firms’ investment decisions over time.
Other recent studies focus on valuation and suggest that mergers might be driven
by misvaluation. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004) develop models where mergers are motivated by overvalued synergy. Empir-
ical studies such as Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2004) and Dong,
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2005) broadly support the misvaluation theory.
Comparing a firm’s market value and some metric of ”fundamental value,” they find
that mergers cluster in overvalued industries, acquirers have higher current valua-
tion, but lower long-run valuation, and cash acquirers are less overvalued than stock
acquirers.
Quite a few papers have studied how characteristics affect asset sales decisions.
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995), and Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walking (2002) relate
decisions to sell assets with liquidity and financing needs. The agency explanation of
asset purchases, though, can be traced back to Jensen (1986). And, a more recent
paper by Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2005) shows that, when severe enough, agency
problem can drive unprofitable defensive acquisitions. Linking asset sales with effi-
ciency, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) argue that firms are more likely to buy (sell)
when they have higher (lower) productivity.
The evidence on market reaction to asset sales is mixed. Alexander, Benson,
and Kampmeyer (1984) find positive abnormal returns for voluntary corporate sell-
offs. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) find that the returns are positive only when
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the proceeds are paid out. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) show that the
announcement return for an acquiring firm is roughly two percent higher for smaller
acquirers regardless of the form of financing and whether the acquired firm is public
or private. Bradley and Sundaram (2005) argue that the most important determinant
of announcement return to acquisition is organizational form, not firm size.
The equilibrium aspect of my model is in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
These authors demonstrate that when an industry experiences a negative aggregate
shock, the resale value of the asset must take a discount, as the potential buyer may
also face cash constraints. The opposite can also be true, as my paper illustrates.
That is, in expansions, when aggregate productivity is higher and orders for new
investments cannot be completely filled in the short run, the increase in demand will
lead to a premium in asset prices. My paper is also related to Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2005), who study capital reallocation activity in the business cycle.
In addition, this paper joins a small, but growing, literature in corporate finance
that matches the simulated panel based on structural models to recover firms’ de-
cisions (Gomes and Livdan (2004), Hennessy and Whited (2004, 2005), Strebulaev
(2004), and Kyle and Meng (2005)). The structural approach provides an useful so-
lution to the endogeneity problem embedded within most empirical studies, which,
as shown by Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2003), is difficult to correct by using the
standard econometric methods, such as control variables, fixed effects or simultaneous
equations.
3 Basic Intuition: An Example
In this section, I use an example to show that (1) firms respond to changes of produc-
tivity through asset sales and purchases, (2) industries with less persistent idiosyn-
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cratic shocks have more reallocation, and (3) asset reallocation is more likely when
aggregate productivity is high.
3.1 Set Up
Consider an industry with only two representative firms (i ∈ {1, 2}), which exist for
two periods (t ∈ {0, 1, 2}). Firms are price-takers. In any period, t, each firm is
endowed with a capital stock ki,t. After observing the industry-level, za,t and firm-
level productivity shocks, zi,t, each firm makes decisions on new investments, Ii,t, and
whether to buy or sell assets (xi,t). A positive xi,t means a purchase and a negative
xi,t is a sale. There is no short selling on new investments, i.e., Ii,t ≥ 0.
There is a timing difference between investing in new assets and buying assets
from other firms. Assets purchased from the other firm can be used for production in
the current period, but it takes one period for new investment to become productive.
The difference in timing reflects the time-to-build attribute of capital investments
such that new machinery and structures usually take several building periods, while
assets purchased from the other firm are already productive at the time of purchase.
After asset sales, the current capacity for production is a sum of initial stock and
assets bought (sold), ki,t+xi,t, and the carried-over capital to the next period is equal
to undepreciated capital plus the new investment (1− δ) (ki,t + xi,t)+ Ii,t. In the last
period, there is assumed to be no production, all capital is liquidated at a given price,
and the two firms collect the proceeds. Firms make decisions on asset sales in the first
two periods {xi,t=0, xi,t=1} , and decide on new investments only in the first period
{Ii,t=0}.
The firm produces output using capital stock ki,t, via an increasing and concave
production function, π:
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π (ki,t, za,t, zi,t) = exp (za,t + zi,t) k
α
i,t (1)
where α < 1.
There are two states of the world, prosperity (za > 0) and depression (−za < 0).
For simplicity, I assume that firm-level shocks also have two states, {z,−z} , and at
any period, t, they are symmetric, i.e., z1,t = −z2,t. Both industry- and firm-level
productivity followMarkov processes. I denote ρa and ρi as the transition probabilities
that the same shock level continues in the next period such that4
Pr [za,t = za,t−1] = ρa and Pr [za,t = −za,t−1] = 1− ρa (2)
Pr [zi,t = zi,t−1] = ρi and Pr [zi,t = −zi,t−1] = 1− ρi
Aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are independent.
I normalize the unit price for new investment to one. The unit price for existing
assets, Pt, comes from market clearing. To account for the transaction costs en-
countered during the process such as searching for partners, negotiating deals, and
legal fee, there is a fixed cost, f , for participating in asset transfer. I write the total
investment costs as:
C [Ii,t, xi,t] = Ii,t +
¡
Pt · xi,t + f · 1xi,t 6=0
¢
(3)
where 1x6=0 is an indicator function that equals one if the firm buys or sells assets.
4To accommodate the symmetric constraint on firm-level productivity, I set up the process such
that firm 1’s firm-level productivity z1, follows a Markov process with transition probability ρi; and
after that is realized, firm 2 will have a shock level of −z1.
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The total cash flow at t, Dt, equals to profit, net of investment costs:
Di,t = πi,t − Ci,t (4)
In both periods, the firm chooses the investment decisions to maximize the present
value plus the sum of expected future cash flow, i.e.,







t = 1 max{xi,t=1} {Di,t=1 + βE [Di,t=2]}
(5)
where β is an intertemporal discount factor.
3.2 Implications
The appendix analyzes the details of the example. Here, I look at results from the
special cases where (1) firms have the same initial size at time 0, i.e., k1,t=0 = k2,t=0 ≡
k; (2) the non-negativity constraint on new investment is not binding, and (3) there
is no requirement to transfer the realized new investments across firms.5
Proposition 1 Let θ denote the share of total assets that the firm with a positive













Fixed cost is not binding First, assume that the fixed cost for transaction, f , in
not binding (I will discuss this participation constraint later). Let {z0, z1}, {θ0, θ1}
and {x0, x1} denote firm 1’s productivity shock, share of total capital, and the amount
of assets it bought (sold) in both periods, respectively.
5I show in the appendix that this is true when z (2ρi − 1) = (2θ − 1) za (2ρa − 1) .
12
Without loss of generality, I assume that firm 1 has a positive shock in the first
period (z0 = z). Then, I have  θ0 = θx0 = ¡θ − 12¢ 2k > 0 (6)
Since firm 1 is more productive, it will buy assets from the other firm.
Similarly, at t = 1, firm 1’s decision in the second period is:
x1 = (1− δ) (2k) (θ1 − θ0) (7)
If firm 1 continues to receive a positive shock (z1 = z), then θ1 = θ. No transaction
is necessary, as its current share of assets is already at the equilibrium:
 θ1 = θ0 = θx1 = 0 (8)
The transaction will occur only if firm 1 experiences a negative shock (z1 = −z)
and becomes less productive, in which case, firm 1 has to sell assets to firm 2, i.e.,
 θ1 = (1− θ)x1 = (1− δ) (2k) (1− 2θ) < 0 (9)
If the participation constraint is not binding in the first period, it will not be
binding in the second period. This is because the efficiency gain from transferring
assets is higher when the less productive firm also holds more capital, as compared to
the case when two firms hold equal capital. Therefore, I can write the expected total
quantity transferred in both periods, X, as the asset transfer in the first period, plus
13









transfer in the first period
+ (1− ρi)| {z }
probability of change
· |(1− δ) (2k) (1− 2θ)|| {z }
transfer in the second period
(10)
Since lower persistence (ρi) means a higher probability of productivity change,
industries with less persistent idiosyncratic shocks will have more asset sales.
With fixed cost So far, I have only considered cases in which the fixed cost is not
binding. With fixed costs, whether a transaction will occur also depends on whether
the gain from transferring assets is high enough to recover the fixed cost.
I show in the appendix that controlling for fixed cost, f , and the difference in
firm-level productivity, z, a transaction will take place if the aggregate shock, za, is
greater than a threshold level, eza where
eza = log (f)− z − log (kα)− log · 1
(2θ)1−α
+ 2θα (1− α)− 1
¸
(11)
Consider a case in which firm 1 always experiences a positive shock and industry
goes from recession to prosperity. There are three possible scenarios: (1) a transaction
will occur in the first period if −za ≥ eza; (2) the transaction will never occur if za < eza,
and (3) a transaction will only occur in the second period if −za < eza < za.
The example above generates an interesting timing implication for asset sales. In
the last case, although the difference in productivity has existed from the first period,
a transaction will only occur when the aggregate productivity improves in prosperity.
As a higher aggregate productivity magnifies the difference in total productivity be-
tween less- and more-productive firms, the gain from the transaction also increases.
The increase in the potential gain makes the transaction more likely to occur, given
a fixed transaction cost.
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On the other hand, given the magnitude of aggregate shock, it implies that indus-
tries with lower fixed costs are more likely to experience higher asset sales activity. I
formalize these predictions in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 (1) Given the fixed cost and shock magnitude, sales are more likely
to occur when aggregate productivity is high (2)Given the aggregate productivity, the
likelihood of asset sales decreases as fixed cost increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
4 A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Asset Sales
Although informative, the two-firm, two-period example has its limitations. There
are only two firms and their shocks are symmetric, so it is very difficult to match
model results to real data where there are many firms. Moreover, the two-period
time frame is too short to analyze firms’ decisions over time, given the fact that asset
sales are infrequent and lumpy.
Therefore, in this section, I develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which the
industry is comprised of a large number of firms and the time horizon is both discrete
and infinite. Just as in the example, firms are perfectly competitive.
4.1 Firms
In each time period t, a firm produces output using capital stock kt, via an increasing
and concave production function, π :




Figure 1: Timing of Events
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where α < 1 and the total productivity factor consists of a common industry shock
za,t and a firm-specific shock zi,t.
I assume that both industry- and firm-specific shocks follow AR(1) processes:
za,t+1 = ρa · za,t + εa,t+1 (13)
zi,t+1 = ρi · zi,t + εi,t+1
where εa,t and εi,t are normal random variables with mean zero and variance σ
2
a
and σ2i , respectively. At each period, za,t and zi,t are independent from each other
and zi,t’s are also independent across firms.
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the decisions.
A firm arrives at period t with a level of capacity kt. It observes the industry-
and firm-level productivity shocks {za,t, zi,t} and makes two interrelated investment
decisions: whether to participate in asset sales and if so, the quantity to buy or sell
(xt); and how much to invest in the new capital, It
6.
6For simply notation, I suppress the firm index, i, from now on.
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Firms cannot sell more than what they have, i.e., kt + xt ≥ 0. If equality holds,
there is a complete ownership transfer. New investment is non-negative and has an
upper bound proportional to current capital stock, 0 ≤ It ≤ Imax × kt. It reflects the
limited supply of new investments in the short run.7
I normalize the unit price of new capital to one and denote the price per unit of
existing capital as P . There is a quadratic adjustment cost for investing in both types
of capital:







kt where j ∈ {I, x} (14)
The coefficient of adjustment costs (γ) describes how costly it is for the firm to
adjust capacity. Since accommodations must be made when additional assets are
either bought or sold, I assume that adjustment costs apply for both asset purchases
and sales8.
There is a fixed cost, f , for participating in asset sales. This fixed cost accounts
for transaction costs encountered in asset purchases and sales, such as searching for
partners, negotiating deals, and legal fee.
As in the example, assets bought from other firms will be available for production
in the same period, but it takes one period for new investments to become productive.
After the asset transfer, the capital available for current production equals to (kt + xt).
7See Jovanovic (1998), who discusses the supply constraint for new capacity in the short run. An
alternative way to model the supply constraint in the short run is to have new capital available, but
in a series of allotments that take place in several periods.
8For a more detailed discussion on adjustment costs, see Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003).
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The firm generates the following cash flow during period t:




1x6=0f + Ptxt + Γx [kt, xt]| {z }
cost/proceeds of asset sales
+ [It + ΓI(kt, It]| {z }
cost of new investment

and the capital carried over to the next period is
kt+1 = (1− δ) (kt + xt) + It (16)
Consider a firm that has k units of installed capital at the beginning of period t,
and a firm-specific productivity shock zi; which also faces an industry productivity
shock za, and a price for current assets, P . The optimization behavior of this firm
can be summarized by a value function V (k, zi; za, P ), which solves the dynamic
programming problem: 9
V [k, zi; za, P ] (17)
= max
0 ≤I ≤ Imax × k
x ≥ −k
D [k, zi; za, P ]| {z }
current cash flow
+ βE {V [k0, z0i; z0a, P 0 | zi; za, P ]}| {z }
expected future firm value

where 0 < β < 1 is the intertemporal discount factor.
The firm maximizes its current cash flow, plus the discounted expected future
value.
9I use the notation k0, z0i, z
0
a, P




Since I can describe each firm in the industry by its beginning size and current firm-
level productivity shock, (k, zi), I can completely summarize the industry structure
(in addition to the aggregate productivity shock, za) by a measure, F [K,ZI ], defined
over the state space where K = {ki} and ZI = {zi}.10
From (17), I can write a firm’s optimal asset sales decision based on state variables
such that:
x = x [k, zi; za, P ] (18)
Let X denote the net aggregate demand for existing capacity. Then market clear-
ing requires that the equilibrium price, P , solves:
X [P | F, za] =
Z
k∈K,zi∈ZI
x [k, zi; za, P ] dF [k, zi] = 0 (19)
In other words, the equilibrium asset price is some function of industry structure
F [.] and aggregate productivity, za:
P = P [F, za] (20)
I assume the law of motion for F [.] as:
F 0 = H [F, za] (21)
Then it follows that the law of motion for P , the equilibrium price, is:
P 0 = P [F 0, z0a] = P [H [F, za] , z
0
a]
10Note that the marginal distribution of zi is exogenous whereas the capital level, ki, is endogenous.
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Using (20) and (21), I can rewrite the value function of the firm as:
V [k, zi; za, F ] (22)
= max
0 ≤I ≤ Imax × k
x ≥ −k
π [k + x; zi, za]
−
Ã
I + P [F, za]x+
P
j∈{I,,x}




V [k0, z0i; z
0
a, F
0]N (dz0i | zi)N (dz0a | za)
where k0 = (1− δ) (k + x) + I
F 0 = H [F, za]
A recursive competitive equilibrium is characterized by the following definition:
Definition 1 (recursive competitive equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilibrium
is a set of decision functions {x [.] , I [.]} , a price function P [.], and a law of motion
H [.], such that:
(i) V [ki, zi; za, F ] solves a firm’s optimization problem in ((22) given H [.] and
P [.]
(ii) P [F, za] satisfies the market clearing condition in (19), such that X [P | F, za] =
0
(iii) H [.] is generated by the decision rules implied by V
Assuming that the fixed cost condition is not binding, the first order conditions
from (22) are:
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− µ1 + µ2| {z }
marginal costs
(23)
where µ1 and µ2 are Lagrange multipliers for the non-negativity (I ≥ 0) and upper
bound (I ≤ Imax × k)constraints of new capital, respectively.
When the participation constraint due to the fixed cost is not binding, firms trade
on assets so that the marginal profit of current assets is equal to the cost (unit price
plus the adjustment cost), minus the expected resale value. In the meantime, firms
make decisions on new investments so that the expected marginal value of capital is
equal to the marginal investment cost.
4.3 Numerical Solution
To solve for the recursive equilibrium described above, I face two numerical challenges.
First, one of the state variables, industry structure F , is a high-dimension object. A
numerical solution to dynamic programming problems becomes increasingly difficult
as the size of state space increases. Second, I need to have an ex ante pricing function,
P = P [F, za], which, when taken by all firms in the industry, can be implied by the
optimal decisions of heterogeneous firms in that industry.
I follow the methods developed in Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998). First, I assume
that firms perceive asset prices as depending only on a subset of moments of F , and
that the law of motion for these moments also depends only on this same set of
moments. Next, I simulate the resulting investment behavior over a long period
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of time. If the simulated time series of moments are very close to those perceived
by the firms, then I argue that the behavior I observe very closely approximates the
rational behavior implied by taking account of the entire distribution, and is therefore
a candidate for an approximate equilibrium.
It turns out that just as in Krusell and Smith (1997), for my model, the first
moment is sufficient to obtain only very small prediction errors.11 The estimated
equilibrium law of motion for capital has an R-square approximately 99 percent and
the estimated pricing function has an R-square around 95 percent. This approxi-
mate aggregation occurs because, in the equilibrium, the mean of the distribution is
sufficient to summarize the aggregate behavior, when there exists a large number of
competitive firms. The prediction error between the perceived and realized law of
motion of capital and the pricing function is within 1 percent. Appendix C offers a
detailed description on the computational strategy.









= b0 + b1 log k if za = z
H
a
P = c0 + c1 log k if za = z
L
a




11Since firm-level shock zi has a zero mean, I approximate the industry structure by the mean
capacity k.
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and rewrite the value function of the firm as
V
£




0 ≤I ≤ Imax × k
x ≥ −k
π [k + x, za, zi]
−
Ã
I + bP £k, za¤x+ P
j∈{I,,x}










N (dz0i | zi)N (dz0a | za)




where bH and bP are identified by the set of parameters ³ ba0, ba1, bb0, bb1´ and ³bc0, bc1, bd0, bd1´,
respectively.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique function V
£
k, zi; za, k
¤
: K × ZI × ZA ×K →
R+, that solves the dynamic program in (25), and generates unique optimal policy
functions I
£









In this section, I first calibrate the model to match the summary statistics obtained
from the data. Next, I discuss the derived optimal asset sales decisions and the
implied aggregate activity in the business cycle. Then, using the simulated panel,
I focus on two empirical issues: the relationship between valuation and asset sales
decisions and the size effect in acquirer returns. Finally, through comparative statics,
I show how several key values of the model affect asset sales activity.
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5.1 Calibration
Since most of my data is available at an annual frequency, I assume that a time pe-
riod in the model corresponds to one year. I pre-chose several parameters from the
literature. Based on Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003), I use the production technol-
ogy parameter α = 0.592, and persistence and dispersion for aggregate productivity
shocks (ρa, σa) = (0.76, 0.05) . I set the intertemporal discount factor, β, to be 1/1.065,
based on Gomes (2001).
Then, I chose the remaining parameters, ρi, σi, f, γI , γx so that the simulated
panel generates moments consistent with the empirical evidence found in Longitudinal
Research Database (LRD). Since the main results of my model are about asset sales
and new investments in the business cycle, I select these parameters to match the
average rate of asset sales and average rate of new investments in both expansions
and recessions, as well as the average percentage of assets bought and sold in asset
sales transactions. 12
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values I use in the calibration and compares
the key summary statistics generated by the model with those found in the data.
Although my model calibration does not reproduce these six statistics exactly, the
simulated panel is reasonably similar to its empirical counterparts.
The model also produces stylized facts, similar to empirical findings, on buyer
and seller characteristics, such as size, productivity, and Tobin’s q. Firms which buy
assets, are slightly larger, compared to average firms, but have higher productivity
and higher Tobin’s q; and, firms which sell assets are much bigger than the average
firms, but have lower productivity and lower Tobin’s q.
12The statistics on the average percentage of assets bought and sold in asset sales transactions are
from Table III (column 2) in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001).
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
5.2 Model Results
5.2.1 Decision on Asset Sales
Figure 2 describes the derived optimal asset sales decisions based on current capacity,
k, firm productivity, zi, and industry productivity, za. The decisions are shown for
different size quartiles. For every quartile, I plot firm-level productivity on the X-axis
and plot the rate of asset sales (x/k) on the Y-axis. The two vertical lines mark
the 25th and 75th percentile of future productivity, based on firm size. The solid and
dotted lines represent decisions in bad and good times, respectively.
First, I find that the expected future productivity increases with firm size. Since a
firm becomes large as a result of a sequence of high firm productivity, and productivity
is persistent, large firms expect a higher future productivity than do small firms. For
firms of all sizes, selling assets is optimal only when realized productivity is much
lower than the expected level (below the 25th percentile), and buying assets is optimal
when productivity appears to be much higher than the expectation (above the 75th
percentile).
Research on asset sales transactions finds that there is a significant difference in
performance between buyers and sellers. For example, both Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz
(1994) and Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walking (2002) find that firms with poor past
performance are more likely to sell assets or divest segments. Here, my model suggests
a new dimension - current size, as an additional determinant. It predicts that given
the same productivity shock, small firms are more likely to buy, and large firms are
more likely to sell, their assets. The intuition is as follows. Since current size serves as
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a proxy for past productivity, given the same productivity shock, the likelihood that
realized productivity is below (above) the expected level is higher (lower) for large
firms. This finding is consistent with Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), who show that
when controlling for productivity, large single-segment firms are more likely to engage
in partial firm sales than small single-segment firms.
In all cases, over time, firms are more likely to engage in asset sales in good times,
when the aggregate productivity is high.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 3 describes the dynamics of a simulated firm along several dimensions. I
show how firm size (k) evolves given the realizations of firm-level productivity shocks
(zi) and I also plot out asset sales (x/k) and new investment (I/k) decisions over
time. Figure 4 presents the distribution of these variables in histogram plots.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AND 4 HERE]
Not surprisingly, firm size is related to productivity shocks. An increase in pro-
ductivity is usually followed by an increase in capacity and a decrease in productivity
leads to downsizing. The firm only buys assets when there is a major increase in
productivity, in which case, it also invests in new assets aggressively. Meanwhile, the
firm sells off existing assets when there is a deep plunge in productivity, and when
that happens, it rarely invests in any new assets at the same time. New investments
occur more frequently than asset sales, although they seem to be lumpy as well.
There exists inactive periods when no investments are made and in other periods,
investments are bounded by the short-run supply constraint.
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5.2.2 Asset Sales in the Business Cycle
To investigate how asset sales activity changes in the business cycle, I simulate a
stylized time path in which 20 periods of recessions are followed by 20 periods of
expansions and then another 20 periods of recessions. I use the parameters specified
in the calibrated model and simulate an industry with 3,000 firms. Figure 5 presents
the time series of aggregate shock, mean capacity, asset price, and rate of asset sales.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
Regardless of the initial distribution, by the end of period 20, the mean capacity,
the average rate of asset sales, and the average rate of new investments all converge to
some constants. This result suggests that the model is stable. At the moment when
the positive shock strikes (t = 21), the industry’s capacity is very low. To respond
to the increase of aggregate productivity, investment shoots up, reaching 20 percent
in the first year and 17 percent in the second year. As a result, the mean capacity
in the industry rises sharply, although at a decreasing rate. The price of the existing
assets also jumps up from $1.08 to $1.12 at the transition. This increase reflects the
higher opportunity cost of capital, and more assets are traded within the industry.
As the positive shock continues and firms expand over time, new investment starts to
slow down and asset prices start to fall. Mean capacity, asset prices, and asset sales
activity stabilize and converge to their long-run equilibria after about 8 periods.
When the negative productivity shock hits (t = 41), the industry is at its highest
capacity, after a sequence of positive shocks. At the onset, new investment shrinks to
10 percent and the general demand to downsize drives asset price down from $1.09
to $1.05. As firms keep reducing their capacity, prices slowly climb. Again, it takes
about 8 periods for capacity, asset prices, and asset sales activity to stabilize at their
long-run equilibria.
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5.3 Reconciling Theory and Evidence
5.3.1 Valuation and Asset Sales Decisions
Recent studies suggest that mergers might be caused by misvaluation, in which case
managers use overvalued equity as cheap currency to purchase assets. (Shleifer and
Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). To support the misvaluation
theory, the empirical study by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2004)
shows that the probability of being an acquirer is higher when the firm has a high
current market-to-book value, but low long-run average.
In the context of this model, I perform a similar analysis for the simulated panel
of firms by defining market-to-book ratio as
MTB = V/K
Table 2 reports the results.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Firms are more likely to acquire when current MTB is high but the long-run
average MTB is low, and they are more likely to sell when current MTB is low but the
long-run average MTB is high. This relationship is similar to evidence documented in
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). Thus, despite the fact that firms
invest optimally and there is no misvaluation in my model, I am able to rationalize
the effect that “long-run low buys long-run high.”
The intuition is as follows. In my model, the decision to buy or sell assets depends
on changes of productivity over time. Since purchasing assets is optimal when pro-
ductivity increases, firms are more likely to buy at times when current productivity
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is above the long-run average, and they are more likely to sell assets when current
productivity is below the long-run average. Therefore, controlling for current MTB,
buyers have lower long-run valuation than do sellers.
Since productivities are fully observable in the model, Table 3 reports the results
from a logit model that uses productivity. Firms are more likely to buy assets when
current productivity is high, and firm size is small; they are more likely to sell assets
when current productivity is low, and firm size is large. In both cases, the marginal
increase in the probability of buying (selling) is higher for larger firms, given an
increase (decrease) in productivity, as indicated by the sign of the interaction between
size and productivity. Firms are more likely to participate in sales while aggregate
productivity is high.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
There is one caveat for comparing results based on the simulated panel of my
model with those reported in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2004). In
my model, I consider only within-industry asset reallocation. Firms do not use asset
purchases as a means to explore growth opportunities in other industries, neither
do they sell off assets to regain focus. Therefore, my model does not, and cannot,
consider mergers across industries.
5.3.2 Size Effect in Acquirer Returns
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find a striking size effect in acquirer returns.
Their study shows that the announcement return for acquiring-firm shareholders is
about two percent higher for smaller acquirers regardless of the form of the financing
and whether the acquired firm is public or private.
29
Since I calibrate my model on annual frequency, it is difficult to capture the
abnormal return in a three-day window around acquisition, as Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz have done in their paper. Nevertheless, I am able to calculate the annual




Table 4 shows the returns for acquirers in different size quartiles before, around,
and after the transaction. Just as in the data, small acquirers have higher returns in
the transaction year. The average return for acquirers in the smallest size quartile is
about 28.6 percent, compared to 18.8 percent for those in the largest size quartile.
Small acquirers also tend to have higher return after the transaction.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
What causes the size effect in acquirer returns in the model, when there is no asym-
metric information, no misvaluation, and firms behave rationally? Panel B presents
the answer. Although small acquirers have lower productivity than large acquirers,
they have much higher increases from the previous year. The average increase in
productivity for small acquirers is about 2.5 times as high as that for large acquirers.
This happens because in the presence of fixed costs, the likelihood of acquisition is
higher when the increase in productivity is great and the firm size is large, both of
which factors lead to a higher dollar payoff. To make an acquisition possible, small
firms need to have a bigger increase in productivity. Therefore, ex post, small acquir-
ers have higher increases in productivity and higher returns. The observed size effect
can be caused by the endogenous sample selection.
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After controlling for changes in productivity, the size effect disappears. Large
acquirers have a slightly higher return, but the impact is minimal.
5.4 New Evidence on Asset Sales
The dynamic model in this paper describes an industry with time-invariant industry-
and firm-level productivity shocks. In this section, I simulate the model with different
parameter values to show how shock attributes affect equilibrium asset sales activity
in the model.
Table 5 reports sensitivities of the simulated moments on model’s parameters.
For each related parameter, I simulate the model twice: once with a parameter value
twenty-five percent above and once with a parameter value twenty-five percent below
the baseline value. Panel A reports the moments and Panel B reports the elasticities.
For each parameter, I calculate elasticity as the change of moments divided by the
change in underlying parameters, multiplied by the ratio of the baseline parameter
over the baseline moment. 13
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
First, I find that fixed costs (f) have a negative effect on asset sales. Higher fixed
costs increase the minimum gain requirement for both buyers and sellers, and result
in fewer sales. On average, firms trade less frequently, but for larger amounts. The
fixed costs here may have several interpretations. For example, they can be related to
the model in Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2004), as a search cost that describes how difficult
it is to find a trading partner. Or they can be viewed as a technology parameter that
13This method is similar to that in Hennessy and Whited (2005).
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accounts for the general transaction costs encountered in asset purchases and sales,
such as financing, communication costs, and legal fees.
Second, persistence and dispersion of firm-level shocks (ρi, σi) have a strong impact
on asset sales. Lower persistence increases the probability that productivity may
change over time, and higher dispersion leads to a greater difference between more-
and less-productive firms. Since asset sales result from changes in productivity and the
likelihood of a transaction occurring is higher with greater productivity differences,
industries with lower persistence and higher dispersion experience more asset sales.
A 25 percent decrease in ρi would result in a 23 percent (14 percent) increase in the
amount of assets sales in good (bad) times, while a 37 percent (21 percent) increase
in participation frequency in good (bad) times. A 25 percent increase in σi leads to a
88 percent (89 percent) increase in the amount of assets sales and almost doubles the
participation frequency in good (bad) times. In the meantime, persistence also has
some effect on new investments. New investments are higher when shocks are more
persistent.
Finally, although not reported here, the attributes of aggregate shock (ρa, σa) have
a moderate effect on new investments, but very little impact on asset sales. Higher
persistence (ρa) makes the current state more likely to linger, and higher dispersion
(σa) increases the difference between good and bad states, both of which factors lead
to higher investments in good times and lower investments in bad times.
The predicted relationship between dynamic shock properties and asset sales ac-
tivity is a novel concept that I raise in this paper. My model shows that asset sales
decisions are path dependent, and, therefore, it is vital to look at them in a dynamic
setting. This argument is different from the Q-theory in Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002), which considers only asset sales that are driven by cross-sectional contempo-
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raneous dispersion in productivity.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that an equilibrium dynamic model of asset sales, in which firms
maximize value through investment decisions on new and existing capacity, generates
patterns of asset sales consistent with the existing evidence, both at the firm- and
at the industry-level. In my model, asset sales allow firms to adjust to changes in
productivity driven by shocks. By moving resources from less to more productive
firms, the activity increases efficiency in the industry.
The dynamic structure of my model enables me to examine several aspects of
asset sales in a very general setting. I consider a firm’s investment decisions over time
and explicitly model the interaction between size, productivity, and valuation. From
the equilibrium pricing, I establish a link between a firm’s investment decisions and
industry-level asset sales activity.
There are four main results. First, I show that some of the evidence previously
used to support the misvaluation theory can be generated from a value-maximization
model without any misvaluation. Firms are more likely to purchase assets at times
when their current productivity is higher than the long-run average, and are more
likely to sell assets when their current productivity is lower than the long-run average.
The fact that shocks are mean reverting leads to the phenomenon that “long-run low
buys long-run high.”
Second, the size effect in acquirer returns can be explained by a sample selection
problem. In the presence of fixed transaction costs, in order to carry out the trans-
action, small acquirers have to have bigger increases in productivity, and, therefore,
ex post, realize higher returns.
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Third, the dynamic properties of productivity shocks have a strong impact on
aggregate asset sales activity: industries with less persistent and more volatile pro-
ductivity shocks experience greater asset sales.
Finally, I show that a fixed transaction cost can generate procyclical asset sales
activity, even when asset prices fully adjust to aggregate shock.
I solve the model in a recursive equilibrium framework through simulations, in
which the industry structure evolves over time and asset prices are endogenously
determined. The model is calibrated using plant-level data from the Longitudinal
Research Database. (LRD).
The model developed in this paper can be generalized along a number of dimen-
sions. For example, in the current model, firms are all equity-financed and there
is no extra cost of issuing new equity. Adding a dimension of costly financing can
bring new insights on how investment decisions interact with financing decisions. The
results then, can shed light on current debate on differences between cash- and stock-
financed acquisitions. Furthermore, with some modification, one can use this model
to study how capital structures affect a firm’s decisions to buy or sell assets. All of
these fruitful areas of corporate finance demand future research.
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7 Tables and Figures
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Table 1: Parameter Values and Summary Statistics
This table reports the parameters of the calibrated model. Following Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2003), I use the production technology parameterα = 0.592, and serial correlation
and standard deviation for industry-level productivity shocks as (ρi, σ) = (0.76, 0.30) .
The intertemporal discount factor β is set to 1/1.065, from Gomes (2001). I choose the
remaining parameters, ρi, σi, f, γI , γx, so that the simulated panel generates moments
consistent with the empirical evidence found in LRD. The moments are the average rate of
asset sales and average rate of new investment in both expansions and recessions, and the
average percentage of assets bought and sold in asset sales transactions. Panel C reports
the characteristics of the buyer firms and seller firms. I calculate Adjusted Size as the
logarithm of the average size of firms in the sample minus the average size of all firms in
the industry, and Adjusted Tobin’s q as the average Tobin’s q in the sample divided by the
average Tobin’s q of all firms in the industry. Tobin’s q is calculated by dividing a firm’s
market value (implied from the value function) to its book value (the level of its capacity).
Panel A: Parameter Values
Parameter (Pre-chosen) Value
Production technology α 0.592
Discount rate β 0.939
Aggregate shock persistence ρa 0.76
Aggregate shock dispersion σa 0.05
Parameter (Calibrated)
Depreciation δ 0.15
Idiosyncratic shock persistence ρi 0.70
Idiosyncratic shock dispersion σi 0.30
Adjustment cost (new capital) γI 0.1
Adjustment cost (asset sales) γx 0.2
Fixed cost (asset sales) f 0.45
Panel B: Summary Statistics
Statistics Model Data
Average asset sales ratio (Expansion) 4.31% 4.29%
Average asset sales ratio (Recession) 3.79% 3.86%
Average new investment ratio (Expansion) 16.95% 17.88%
Average new investment ratio (Recession) 13.51% 13.93%
Percentage of assets sold 30.45% 28.2%a
Percentage of assets bought 45.48% 53.8%a
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Panel C: Asset Buyers and Asset Sellers (Model)
Buyer Seller Non-Action Firms
Adjusted Size 1.12 1.45 1
Adjusted Tobin’s q 1.08 0.67 1
37
Table 2: Valuation and Asset Sales Decisions
The table reports the estimation results of a Logit model that uses the simulated panel
based on the calibrated model. In all cases, the simulated panel consists of 3,000 firms and
200 periods. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to one
if a firm purchases assets (x > 0) and equals to zero if it does not buy or sell assets (x = 0).
In Column (2), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to one if a firm sells
assets (x < 0) and equals to zero if it does buy or sell assets (x = 0). In Column (3), the
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to one if a firm is an acquirer (x > 0)
and equals to zero if a firm is a seller (x < 0). MTBi,t is the market-to-book ratio for firm
i at time t. It is calculated as the ratio of firm value divided by its capacity. MTBi is the
average market-to-book ratio for firm i, andMTBt is the average market-to-book ratio for
all firms at time t. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
1 if Acquirer, 1 if Seller, 1 if Acquirer,











Pseudo R2 .147 .406 .812
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Table 3: Productivity and Asset Sales Decision
The table reports the estimation results of a Logit model that uses the simulated panel
based on the calibrated model. In all cases, the simulated panel consists of 3,000 firms and
200 periods. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to
one if a firm purchases assets (x > 0) and equals to zero if it does not buy or sell assets
(x = 0). In Column (2), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to one
if a firm sells assets (x < 0) and equals to zero if it does not buy or sell assets (x = 0).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
1 if Acquirer, 1 if Seller,




Firm-level Shock 88.086∗∗∗ −40.591∗∗∗
(1.021) (.481)
SIZE × Firm-level Shock 10.188∗∗∗ −9.989∗∗∗
(.251) (.164)
Industry-level Shock 27.594∗∗∗ 11.043∗∗∗
(.342) (.191)
Pseudo R2 .97 .95
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Table 4: Size Effect in Acquirer Returns
The table reports the estimation results on the size effect in acquirer returns that use the
simulated panel based on the calibrated model. In all cases, the simulated panel consists of
3000 firms and 200 periods. Panel A shows the returns for acquirers in the transaction year
as well as returns two and one year prior to the transaction and one and two year after the
transaction for all size quartiles. Panel B reports the average current and lagged firm-level
productivity for acquirers in all size quartiles. Panel C presents the regression results. In
Column (1) and (2), I use only the subsample in which a firm has acquired assets. The
dependent variable is the return of that year. Column (3) reports results using a Logit
model estimation, where the dependent variable equals to one if a firm acquires and zero
otherwise. In all tables, t is year when firms acquire assets. I define return as the ratio




Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Acquirer Return by Size
Size Quartiles RET (t− 2) RET (t− 1) RET (t) RET (t+ 1) RET (t+ 2)
1 −0.6% 6.2% 28.6% 10.5% 3.9%
2 1.6% 7.7% 24.8% 9.2% 1.6%
3 3.9% 11.7% 25.4% 9.0% −3.2%
4 7.6% 13.7% 18.8% 5.1% −7.8%
Panel B: Change in Productivity
Size Quartiles Pct. of Productivity Lagged Change in
Assets Acquired Productivity Productivity
(xt/kt) (zi,t) (zi,t−1) (zi,t − zi,t−1)
1 62% 0.38 −0.22 0.60
2 52% 0.54 0.08 0.47
3 56% 0.74 0.32 0.42
4 37% 0.78 0.53 0.25
Panel C: Acquirer Return and Probability of Acquisition
Acquirer Return Acquirer Return Prob(Acquirer)
(1) (2) (3)
SIZE −.026∗∗∗ .005∗∗∗ 2.097∗∗∗
(.0008) (.0009) (.013)
Pct. of Assets Acquired .291∗∗∗
(.001)
Aggregate Productivity .256∗∗∗ .287∗∗∗ 1.893∗∗∗
(.003) (.003) (.043)
Change in Productivity .273∗∗∗ 7.864∗∗∗
(.001) (.027)
R2 .53 .50 .38
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Table 5: Sensitivity of Model Moments to Parameters
This table presents model moments when I adjust model parameters, with respect to the
calibrated model. The baseline parameters are: f = 0.5 ρa = 0.76, σa = 0.05, ρi = 0.70,
σi = 0.3. For each parameter, I simulate the model twice: once with a value of parameter
of interest 25% above and once with a value 25% below the baseline value. Panel A reports
the moments and Panel B reports the elasticities. For each parameter, I calculate elasticity
as the change of moments divided by the change in underlying parameters multiplied by
the ratio of baseline structural parameter over the baseline moment.
Panel A: Simulated Moments
Base Fixed Cost (f) Persistence (ρi) Dispersion (σi)
+∆ −∆ +∆ −∆ +∆ −∆
X
K
(za = H) 4.31% 3.73% 5.49% 2.96% 5.28% 8.09% 1.33%
X
K
(za = L) 3.79% 3.13% 4.60% 2.53% 4.32% 7.15% 1.04%
I
K
(za = H) 17.0% 16.4% 17.1% 16.8% 13.4% 16.7% 16.8%
I
K
(za = L) 13.5% 13.4% 13.7% 13.4% 10.3% 13.5% 13.2%
Freq (x > 0,H) 7.74% 6.42% 10.32% 5.84% 10.57% 12.63% 2.98%
Freq (x > 0, L) 6.79% 6.18% 8.83% 4.58% 8.23% 11.50% 2.54%
E(x | x > 0) 45.5% 47.4% 42.2% 41.3% 41.4% 51.3% 39.1%
E(x | x < 0) −30.5% −31.6% −29.6% −23.4% −29.8% −33.3% −25.3%
Panel B: Elasticity of Model Parameters
Fixed Cost (f) Persistence (ρi) Dispersion (σi)
X
K
(za = H) −0.682 −0.988 3.137
X
K
(za = L) −0.765 −0.807 3.224
I
K
(za = H) −0.005 0.336 −0.017
I
K
(za = L) 0.012 0.398 0.047
Freq (x > 0,H) −0.829 −1.093 2.494
Freq (x > 0, L) −0.916 −0.969 2.639
E(x | x > 0) 0.376 −0.012 0.540
E(x | x < 0) 0.250 −0.369 0.521
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Figure 2: Optimal Decision Rule of Asset Sales
This figure illustrates the derived optimal decision rules on asset sales, given a firm’s current
capacity (k) and the firm-level productivity shock (zi). Decisions are shown in four size
quartiles. For each size quartile, I plot the firm-level productivity shocks on the X-axis and
the rate of asset sales (x/k) on the Y-axis. The two vertical lines mark the 25th and 75th
percentile of the expected shock level, based on beginning capacity. The solid and dotted
lines represent decisions in bad and good times, respectively.
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Figure 3: Time Path of A Simulated Firm
This figure illustrates a time path of a simulated firm. I plot the beginning capacity
(k), firm-level productivity shock (zi), percentage of assets bought (sold) (x/k) and
new investments (I/k). For each plot, time is on the X-axis. The simulation is based
on the calibrated baseline model.
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Figure 4: Histogram of Size, Shocks, Asset Sales and New Investments
This figure illustrates the distribution of the capacity (k), firm-level productivity
shock (zi), percentage of assets bought (sold) (x/k) and new investments (I/k) over
time for a simulated firm using histogram plots. The simulation is based on the
calibrated baseline model.
44
Figure 5: Asset Sales in the Business Cycle
This figure illustrates asset sales activity in the business cycle through a simulated
panel. Four subplots show the time series of industry-level shock, average capacity,
price of existing assets, and asset sales activity, respectively. I base the simulation
on the benchmark model of 3,000 firms, in which I set aggregate productivity shocks
such that 20 consecutive negative shocks are followed by 20 positive shocks and then
finished with 20 negative shocks.
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Essay 2:
What Drives Asset Sales - The Empirical Evidence
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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze how changes in productivity affect firms’ decision to
trade assets, and what this implies for the industry-level asset sales activity over time.
We find that the patterns of transactions (firm-level purchase/sale decisions, and the
cross-industry and the time-series variation in asset sales activities) are consistent
with the model developed in Yang(2005).
Using the plant-level data from Longitudinal Research Database on manufactur-
ing firms in the period of 1973 to 2000, we show that: (1) asset purchases are more
likely when firms’ existing plants experience increases in productivity, and asset sales
are more likely when firms have decreases in productivity (“rising buys falling”); (2)
shock attributes such as persistence and dispersion help to explain the cross-industry
variation in asset sales - industries with less persistent and more widely dispersed
productivity shocks, on average, have higher rates of assets sales; and (3) within an
industry, periods with more uncertainty regarding firms’ relative productivity posi-
tions are associated with more frequent trades of existing assets.
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1 Introduction
There exists a large and active market where firms trade their operational assets. In
manufacturing industries, about 4 percent of the total existing assets change own-
ership every year in the period of 1974 - 2000. The intensity of asset sales varies
significantly by industry. In our sample period, the average rate of plants that change
ownership ranges from 1.87 percent to 6.26 percent. What makes assets in an indus-
try more likely to be traded than assets in other industries? Are there any intrinsic
industry characteristics that make assets more liquid in an industry? The activity of
asset sales also differs over time. Within the same industry, the percentage of plants
traded in an active period can be five times as high as that in an inactive period.
What explains the time-clustering in asset sales?
This paper addresses these questions by examining the fundamental forces that
motivate firms to trade their assets, and by investigating the implications it has for
the asset reallocation activity in the industry over time. We show that firms optimally
adjust their capacity to respond to changes in productivity brought by shocks. Shock
attributes such as persistence and dispersion explain the cross-industry differences
in asset sales - more transactions occur in industries with less persistent and widely
dispersed shocks. Over time, firms are more likely to trade in years when uncertainty
regarding their relative positions within the industry is higher.
Why do firms trade and which firms participate in asset sales? Neoclassical the-
ory suggests that assets will be transferred from less- to more-productive firms to
gain efficiency, a pattern identified as “high buys low”. Stemmed from the efficiency
argument, several papers have studied the relationship between the dispersion of pro-
ductivity and the activity of capital reallocation. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001)
suggest that industries with wider productivity distribution should have more trans-
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actions, as gains from transferring assets are higher in those industries. Studying the
productivity dispersion and the transaction flow in the business cycle, Eisfeldt and
Rampini (2005) argue that the costs of reallocating assets (liquidity costs) have to be
counter-cyclical to generate the observed lower trading volume in recessions, at which
times, productivity is more dispersed across firms. Meanwhile, Rhodes-Kropf, Robin-
son and Viswanathan (2004) develop a model of mergers based on searching costs.
Using the transaction data of M&As, they find that buyers have similar Tobin’s q as
sellers do, a phenomenon they call “like buys like”. Since the cost of finding a merger
partner is lower when firms are similar rather than far apart, their theory implies
that industries with less dispersion in productivity should have more transactions.
Yang (2005) proposes a different view. It develops a dynamic equilibrium model to
show that firms optimally adjust their capacity to respond to changes in productivity
brought by productivity shocks. Firms, which have increases in productivity, choose
to purchase assets, and firms, which experience decreases in productivity, sell off
existing assets to downsize (“rising buys falling”). The shuffling of firms’ relative
productivity positions, rather than their productivity levels, drives the decisions of
asset purchases and sales. In other words, there is no fixed rule on the productivity
levels between the buyer and the seller. In a value maximizing transaction, the buyer
can have lower or higher productivity than the seller. Since asset sales are driven by
uncertainty in productivity over time, on the aggregate level, the model predicts that
industries with more shuffling in productivity would experience greater asset sales.
In this paper, using the plant-level data from the Longitudinal Research Database,
we empirically test the model predictions of Yang (2005). We find that the patterns
of transactions (firm-level purchase/sale decisions, and cross-industry and time-series
variation in industry-level asset sales activity) are consistent with the model predic-
tions.
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We have three main findings. First, asset purchases are more likely when firms’
existing plants experience increases in productivity, and asset sales are more likely
when firms have decreases in productivity (“rising buys falling”). Buyers and sellers
of existing assets tend to be diversified firms which produce in more than one three-
digit SIC industries. Firms are more likely to buy assets if the increase in productivity
happens in the main segments. The probability of selling off existing assets is higher
when the decrease in productivity occurs in the peripheral segments. These findings
are consistent with those in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001).
Second, shock attributes such as persistence and dispersion help to explain the
cross-industry variation in asset sales - industries with less persistent and more widely
dispersed productivity shocks, on average, have higher rates of assets sales. Together,
the persistence and dispersion of productivity shocks explain about 16 percent of the
industry-fixed-effect of asset sales in our sample period. Industries with lower asset
turnover ratios and higher profit margins also have more trades.
Next, within an industry, periods with more uncertainty regarding firms’ relative
productivity positions are associated with more frequent trading in existing assets.
A xx percent increase in industry uncertainty leads to a xx percent increase in the
amount of assets traded. More assets are traded in expansion periods.
Our paper primarily relates to the literature on asset sales and the literature on
mergers.
The hypothesis that merger activities are driven by broad economic shocks can be
traced to Gort (1969). Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) propose a model in which firms
with higher productivity acquire firms with lower productivity. Since their model
builds on the constant return to scale technology, it focuses on cross-sectional contem-
poraneous sales, rather than on activities over time. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)
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present an equilibrium model to show how firms respond differently to aggregate
demand shocks based on their productivity. The relation between economic shocks
and asset reallocation has been documented in empirical studies, such as Mitchell
and Mulherin(1996), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Andrade and Stafford
(2004) and Harford (2005). Our paper contributes to this literature by providing an
explanation on how economic shocks affect the trading of existing assets. We argue
that economic shocks increase the probability of firms’ relative positions shuffling over
time and firms optimally respond to the changes by trading more frequently.
Our study also contributes to the debate on why firms trade and which firms
participate in asset sales. Contrary to the neoclassical theory, which suggests that
buyers can utilize assets more efficiently than sellers do, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and
Viswanathan (2004) present the evidence that buyers and sellers have similar Tobin’s
q. They argue that in reality, it is “like buys like” rather than “high buys low”. In
this paper, we bring to the debate a new perspective. Instead of measuring the level
of productivity between buyers and sellers, we examine how changes in productivity
affect firms’ decisions to trade assets. Our study suggests that when firms make a
series of investment decisions over time under uncertainty, changes in productivity
may be more important than the level itself.
Furthermore, this paper extends our understanding of the relationship between
productivity dispersion and the asset sales activity in the industry. We consider not
only the dispersion of productivity distribution, but also how likely firms’ positions
shuffle within the distribution. In the equilibrium, both factors are necessary to
facilitate trading over time. Without the shuffling effect, firms only trade once, and
there is no need to buy or sell afterwards, even when the differences in productivity
exists. Through shock attributes such as persistence and dispersion, we establish a
link between the nature of the industry and the frequency that assets are traded in
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the industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss our analytical
framework and the set up testable hypotheses in Section II. The data and estimation
methods are discussed in Section III. Section IV presents test results and Section V
concludes.
2 Analytical Framework and Hypotheses
The hypotheses that we examine in this paper are motivated by a dynamic equilibrium
model of asset sales in Yang (2005). In that model, a firm maximizes its value by
making two inter-related decisions: how much to invest in new assets and whether
to buy or sell existing assets. These decisions are made under both firm-level and
industry-level productivity shocks. The model assumes that it takes one period for
new investments to become productive, while assets bought from other firms are
available for production immediately. Given this difference in availability, firms make
new investments to account for the expected future growth, but participate in asset
sales to fix current investment needs. The price of new capital is assumed to be
constant and the price of existing assets is derived from the equilibrium based on
the demand and supply of current capacity. The model provides predictions on how
changes in productivity affect firms’ decisions to trade assets and how the reallocation
of assets differs by industry and varies over time. These predictions are different from
the predictions of models that focus on the level of the productivity. We describe the
model and set hypotheses motivated by the model in this section.
The model focuses on how firms choose to buy or sell assets when productivity is
stochastic. Firms produce based on a decreasing return to scale technology and the
level of productivity affects how much output a firm can produce using one unit of
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input. A more productive firm can generate more output using the same amount of
input and it is larger in size. The concept of productivity can have many interpreta-
tions. For example, productivity can be a proxy for the managerial quality. A more
skilled manager organizes the production process more efficiently and therefore pro-
duces more outputs. Since the managerial talent is limited and the marginal benefit
of having a skilled manager decreases in the amount of assets managed, decreasing
return to scale seems to be a reasonable assumption.
When the productivity of a firm increases following a positive shock, the firm
demands more capacity. To expand, it can buy assets from other firms, invest in new
capital, or do both. How much to buy or invest depends on the relative costs and how
persistent the shocks are. An illiquid capacity market with higher transaction costs
makes buying assets more costly and therefore leads to fewer trades. When shocks
are not as persistent, given a positive shock, instead of investing in new assets and
getting the needed capacity in the next period, firms may choose to buy assets from
others to take advantage of the higher productivity at the moment. On the other
hand, when a negative shock hits, it becomes inefficient for the firm to operate at the
existing scale under the lower productivity, and this firm may choose to sell off its
assets. Thus, the model predicts that assets flow from firms with falling productivity
to firms with rising productivity. These predictions are summarized in the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (Probability of Asset Purchases and Sales) Purchases of assets are
more likely when firms have increases in productivity and sales of assets are more
likely when firms have decreases in productivity.
Lower persistence in productivity shocks means that firms do not stay at the same
productivity levels for a long time and shuffling of productivity positions among firms
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is common. On the other hand, when shocks are more widely dispersed, the larger
shock magnitude increases the potential gain from transferring assets, and makes
transaction more likely to occur in the presence of transaction cost. Hence, the model
predicts that industries with less persistent and more widely dispersed productivity
shocks have more assets traded across firms.
One caveat worth mentioning here is that the impact persistence has on trades also
depends on the magnitude of transaction cost. When the transaction cost is low, lower
persistence leads to more shuffling in productivity, and more asset reallocation in the
industry. However, if it is very costly to transfer assets and especially when firms have
to pay a large fixed cost to enter into the market, a decrease in persistence may not
lead to an increase in asset sales. This is because when the increase in productivity
is not sustainable, it will be costly to sell off assets when productivity drops in the
future. Given this consideration, firms with rising productivity may choose not to buy
assets. Therefore, the amount of assets traded in an industry depends on the relative
scales of shock persistence, shock magnitude and transaction costs. The existence of
transaction cost will weaken the relation between shock attributes and the rate of
asset reallocation in the industry.
The following hypothesis summarizes the model’s prediction.
Hypothesis 2 (Cross-industry Variation) Industries with lower persistence and higher
dispersion in idiosyncratic productivity shocks have higher rate of asset sales.
It is well documented in the literature that asset sales come in waves and the same
pattern holds for both partial and complete ownership transfers. Andrade, Mitchell
and Stafford (2001) show that industries that exhibit higher level of merger activity
in the 1980s’ are no more likely to do so in the 1990’s. Harford (2005) find that
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the average number of bids an industry sees in a 24-month non-wave period is 7.8,
compared to 34.3 during the wave period from 1981 to 2000. Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001) show that an average of 6.19 percent of manufacturing firms are involved in
mergers and acquisitions and asset sales in expansion years, compared to an average
of 3.89 percent over all years. Economic shocks such as deregulation, changes in
input costs, capital liquidity and industry demand, are often viewed as causes for the
formation of asset reallocation wave.
In this paper, we propose an explanation of how economic shocks can affect the
trading of existing assets in the industry in the spirit of Yang (2005). Consider an
industry that is in the midst of an economic shock through changes of technology,
changes of cost of inputs, or deregulation. The uncertainty regarding firms’ relative
positions in the industry increases dramatically. For example, when a new technology
arrives, whether a currently more-productive firm can remain at its position depends
on whether the firm adopts the new technology, the percentage of other firms in the
industry that choose to adopt the new technology, and the amount of uncertainty
in the new technology. The increase in the uncertainty during the transition period
increases the probability that firms’ relative productivity may change over time, which
can lead to large-scale asset reallocation in the industry. We formalize this prediction
in the hypothesis below.
Hypothesis 3 (Time-series Variation) For a given industry, time periods with more
uncertainty regarding firms’ relative positions are associated with higher rate of asset
sales.
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3 Data and Methodology
We use data from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), maintained by the
Center for Economic Studies at the Bureau of the Census. The LRD is a large micro
database containing plant-level information for approximately 50,000 manufacturing
plants in the SIC codes 2000 - 3999.14
There are several advantages of using the LRD for our study, relative to using data
from Compustat. First, LRD covers both public and private firms in the manufactur-
ing industry. This allows us to track down transactions that involve both public and
private acquirers and targets. Second, it offers detailed information of output and
input, so that we can estimate productivity on the plant level. Third, it has separate
identifiers for plants and firms; hence, we can track down plants even as they change
owners. This tractability is very important for this study, as it allows us to identify
assets that have changed ownership. We can then identify buyers and sellers, and
study the productivity of their existing/remaining plants around the transactions.
Our sample covers the period from 1972 to 2000. We aggregate plants into firm-
level business segments at the three-digit SIC level and exclude segments that have
less than $1 million in the real value of shipments in 1982 dollars. The sample used
here is the same as in Maksimovic and Phillips (2004).
Productivity Measures The productivity calculation follows Schoar (2002). We
obtain plant productivity from estimating a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion for each industry-year with the following specification:
ln(Yijt) = ajt + bjt ln (Kijt) + cjt ln (Lijt) + djt ln (Mijt) + zijt (1)
14See Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) for a detailed description of the LRD.
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where Yijt is the total value of shipments of plant i in industry j at time t, Kijt, Lijt
and Mift represent the value of capital stock, the equivalent total production man-
hours and value of inputs of plants i in industry j at time t, respectively. We calculate
the value for capital stock (K) as a sum of book value of structures and equipment.15
We adjust labor inputs (L) to reflect both production and non-production man hours.
Inputs (M) are expenses for parts and intermediate goods, fuel, and energy purchased.
As pointed out by Schoar (2002), since coefficients on capital, labor and material
inputs may vary by industry and by year, this specification allows for different factor
intensities in different industry-years. Moreover, since the constant term (ajt) varies
with time, it helps to filter out the changes in industry-level productivity. This is
very crucial for our study since we want to estimate the persistence and dispersion of
the firm-level productivity shocks, and the uncertainty regarding the change of firms’
relative position within the industry.
The idiosyncratic productivity is, then, the estimated residual from these regres-
sions, which measures a plant’s relative productivity in that industry-year. It mea-
sures the difference between the actual output and predicted output, given the amount
of inputs the plant uses and the mean industry production technology in place. A
plant that produces more than the predicted amount of the output has a greater-
than-average productivity.
Rate of Asset Sales Similar to Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), we define the rate
of asset sales as the ratio of the number of plants that change ownership over the total
15To account for depreciation of beginning of period capital stock, we use data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis to make depreciation adjustment for beginning period capital stock at the two-
digit level. To the beginning of period capital stock, we add the real dollars (in real 1982 dollars)
spent on capital expenditures for additions to the capital stock.
57






1 (Plant i changes ownership from t− 1 to t) (2)
where 1 () is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if a plant changes
ownership from t− 1 to t and njt is the total number for firms in industry j at time
t.
On average, 3.7 percent of large manufacturing plants change ownership every year
during the 1974 to 2000 period. The number is higher in expansion years, approaching
4.3 percent.17
4 Tests and Results
4.1 The Probability of Asset Purchases and Sales
In this section, we test Conjecture 1 of probability of asset purchases and sales. We
calculate productivity for all firm segments at the plant level based on (1). For firms
that have more than one plant in a segment, the segment productivity is calculated as
the weighted average of productivity of all plants in the segment, using the predicted
plant outputs as weights. We perform our analysis on the firm segment level.
4.1.1 Probability of Asset Purchases
We identify a firm segment as a buyer if it has produced outputs in the previous
period and has bought at least one plant in the current period. Therefore, we do not
16For robustness, I also use the ratio of the book value of assets that change ownership over the
total book value of assets in the industry as a measure for the asset sales rate. The results are
qualitatively the same.
17Using LRD data from 1974—1992, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) document similar facts. They
find an average asset sales rate of 3.89 percent and a rate of 6.89 percent for expansion years.
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consider cases in which firms buy assets to enter into new industries. Research has
shown that firms that choose to diversify are not as productive as firms that stay in
their existing industries, controlling for sizes.18 Since the focus here is to investigate
the decisions to expand or downsize instead of the decisions to diversify or refocus,
we exclude samples that are related to diversification for our analysis.
Conjecture 1 above suggests that a firm’s decision to buy assets is influenced
by changes in productivity. Firms, which experience increases in productivity, are
more likely to buy assets from other firms. To test this effect, we run a Probit
regression using an unbalanced panel. We use the changes of segment productivity in
buyer’s existing plants to approximate the productivity shock in the current period.
We control for firm size (SIZE), organization form (whether the firm participate
in multiple industries) (D MULTI), importance of the segment (whether it is the
firm’s main segment) (D MAIN),19 capital expenditure (CAPX), and profitability
(OPMARG). To take into account of the industry effect, we also control for industry
characteristics such as the average rate of sales growth (D ECON), industry average
profitability (I OPMARG), overall industry uncertainty (I γ) and the productivity
dispersion in the industry (I DISP).
Our specification is as follows:
Pr (D BUYij,t) = β0 + β1Zij,t−1 + β2∆gZij,t + β3Xi,t−1 + β4Yij,t−1 + εij,t (3)
where D BUYij,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i is a buyer
in industry j at time t; Zij,t−1 is the lagged productivity of firm i in industry j ; and
18See Maksimovic and Phillips (2002).
19We identify a segment to be the main segment if it contributes to at least 25% of the firm’s total
shipment.
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∆gZij,t captures the change of productivity of the existing plants for firm i in industry
j from time t− 1 to t. Xi,t−1 includes all lagged control variables for industry j, and
Yij,t−1 includes all lagged control variables for firm i in industry j.
The results in Table 1 show that changes in productivity affect the probability
of asset purchases. A firm is more likely to buy assets when there is an increase in
productivity. This impact is significant, even after controlling for the lagged produc-
tivity level. Multi-segment firms are also more likely to purchase assets, especially
for their main segments. The probability of asset purchase is higher when the firm
has high profit margin, low capital expenditure and the industry in which it operates
has high profit margin, more shuffling in relative positions, and more concentrated
productivity distribution. A firm is also more likely to buy assets when its industry
is in expansion, experiencing positive demand shock.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
4.1.2 Probability of Asset Sales
A seller is a firm segment that sells off part or all of its plants in the next period. We
do not distinguish between partial and complete sell-offs.
Conjecture 1 above suggests that firms choose to sell off assets when they experi-
ence decreases in productivity. To test this effect, we run a Probit regression on the
unbalanced panel. We use the changes in productivity in the current period as a proxy
for productivity shock and examine how this affects a firm’s decision to sell off assets
in the next period. We assume that a firm observes the changes and makes decisions
on whether to sell assets; and that if it decides to sell, the assets will be transferred
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in the next period.20 We control for firm size (SIZE), organization form (whether
the firm participate in multiple industries) (D MULTI), importance of the segment
(whether it is the firm’s main segment) (D MAIN),21 capital expenditure (CAPX),
asset turnover (ATTURN) and profitability (OPMARG). We also control for indus-
try characteristics such as average rate of sales growth (D ECON), industry average
profitability (I OPMARG), overall industry uncertainty (I γ) and the dispersion of
productivity distribution (I DISP).
Our specification is as follows:
Pr (D SELLijt) = β0 + β1Zij,t−1 + β2∆Zij,t−1 + β3Xj,t−1 + β4Yij,t−1 + εij,t (4)
where D SELLijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i sells off
assets in industry j at time t; Zij,t−1 is the lagged productivity of firm i in industry j,
and ∆Zij,t−1 captures the previously observed changes of productivity from t − 2 to
t− 1. Xj,t−1 includes all lagged control variables for industry j, and Yij,t−1 includes
all lagged control variables for firm i in industry j.
Table 2 reports the results. Changes in productivity strongly affect a firm’s deci-
sion to sell its existing assets. Firms are more likely to sell assets when they experience
decreases in productivity in the previous period and when the current productivity
is low. Multi-segment firms are also more likely to sell assets, especially for their
peripheral segments. The probability of asset sales is higher when the firm has low
asset turnover ratio and when its industry has high profitability, more uncertainty in
20We use the change in the previous period because when a firm exits the industry by selling off
all of its assets, the information on current productivity is no long available.
21We identify a segment to be the main segment if it contributes to at least 25% of the firm’s total
shipment.
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relative productivity, and more concentrated productivity distribution.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
In sum, the results in Table 1 and Table 2 conform the importance of changes
in productivity on firms’ decisions to buy or sell assets. Firms are more likely to
buy assets when their segments have rising productivity and they are more likely
to sell assets when their segments have falling productivity. Besides, consistent with
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002), we also find that multi-segment firms are more
likely to participate in asset purchases and sales. And, for multi-segment firms, given
an increase in productivity, the probability of a purchase is higher when it is a main
segment, and given a decrease in productivity, the probability of a sale is higher when
the segment is peripheral.
4.2 Cross-Industry Variation in Asset Sales
In the previous section, we show how changes of productivity affect firms’ decisions to
buy or sell assets. In this section, we investigate the implication this effect has for the
industry-level asset reallocation. If asset purchases and sales are driven by changes
in productivity, do industries with more intrinsic uncertainty due to the nature of
the uncertainty have more asset sales? Can attributes of productivity shocks such as
persistence and dispersion explain the cross-industry variation in asset sales?
There could be many reasons why firms in some industries face more uncertainty
regarding their relative positions in the industry. For example, rapid technology
changes can make a firm’s future position within the industry less predictable. Firms
may face greater risks of remaining current positions in the industry when product
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markets are differentiated and the consumers’ tastes are hard to predict. Where the
industry is at in the life cycle also matters to the uncertainty. Young industries in
general have more risks than mature industries.
4.2.1 Estimation of Shock Persistence and Dispersion
To estimate the persistence and dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks for industry, j, we
fit an AR (1) process:
dzij,t = ρj\zij,t−1 + εijt (5)
where dzij,t is the estimated idiosyncratic productivity of plant i in industry j at
time t using (1).
We use the autoregressive coefficient ρj as a measure of shock persistence, and
the standard deviation of the error terms as the measure of shock dispersion such




, where nj is the total number of plants in industry j
and T is the total number of years in the sample.
To have a stable time series for the AR(1) estimation, we delete industries with less
than 50 plants in any given year and industries with less than five years of observation
in the time series. Our final sample consists of estimates for persistence and dispersion
for 112 industries.
High shock persistence implies that productivity follows a persistent trend - be-
ing more productive in the current period increases the chances of remaining more
productive in the next period. Meanwhile, dispersion measures the magnitude of
the noise term in productivity shocks. Firms in industries with less persistent and
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more widely dispersed productivity shocks, face higher degree of uncertainty in their
relative positions.
Conjecture 2 above suggests that industries with more uncertainty, i.e. less per-
sistent and more widely dispersed productivity shocks, have more trades of existing
assets. We test this pattern in two ways. First, we compare the average rate of
asset sales across industries and test whether shock persistence and dispersion ex-
plain the cross-industry differences. Next, we estimate a model with industry fixed
effect to control for other potential factors that are relevant to asset sales and may
be time-variant.
4.2.2 Differences in Average Rate of Asset Sales
We divide industries in our sample into three groups, each with an equal number
of observations based on shock persistence ρ and dispersion σ, respectively. Table 3
shows the summary statistics of each ρ−group and σ−groups. Industries vary signif-
icantly in persistence and dispersion. The High-ρ group has an average persistence of
0.70 and the Low-ρ group has an average persistence of 0.56. The average dispersion
in High- and Low-σ groups is 0.15 and 0.30, respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
We first compare the rates of asset sales between High-ρ and Low-ρ groups and
between High-σ and Low-σ groups in a univariate setting. The results are shown
in Table 3. On average, the High-ρ group has an asset sales rate of 3.80 percent,
compared to a rate of 4.22 percent in the Low-ρ group. The High-σ group has an
asset sales rate of 4.01 percent, while the Low-σ group has an asset sales rate of 3.67
percent. Both T-test and Mann-Whitney rank test reject the null hypotheses that
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rates of asset sales do not differ significantly across ρ groups or σ groups. Instead,
they suggest that firms in industries in Low-ρ and High-σ groups have more trades.
Table 4 reports how shock persistence and dispersion affect the average rate of
asset sales in the industry in a multivariate setting, after controlling for other industry
characteristics. We use the following specification:
sj = β0 + β1ρj + β2σj + γ ·Xj + εj (6)
where sj measures the average rate of asset sales in industry j; ρj and σj are
shock persistence and shock dispersion, respectively, based on (5); Xj includes con-
trol variables for industry characteristics such as capital expenditure (CAPX), asset
turnover(ATTURN), profitability (OPMARG) and average percent of years the in-
dustry spends in expansion (ECON).
Persistence and dispersion significantly affect how frequently firms trade assets in
an industry, individually or jointly. Industries with less persistent and more dispersed
productivity shocks, on average, have higher rates of asset sales (β1 < 0 and β2 > 0).
Lower asset turnover ratio and higher profit margin are also related more active
trading. Industries with higher rates of asset sales tend to have lower rates of cap-
ital expenditure, suggesting that internal growth (capital expenditure) and external
growth (asset purchases) may serves as substitutes. Although the average percentage
of years an industry spends in expansion has a positive effect on the rates of asset
sales, the effect is not significant.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
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4.2.3 Industry Fixed Effect of Asset Sales
The amount of asset reallocation in the economy tends to vary over time and asset
sales come in waves (Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005)). Industry characteristics that
affect how assets transfer across firms may also change over time. In this section,
we perform a two-step estimation to control for the time variant in asset sales. We
first estimate the industry fixed effect of asset sales using a panel regression; then we
examine how much variation in the estimated industry fixed effects can be explained
by attributes of productivity shocks such as persistence and dispersion.
In the first step, we use the following specification to estimate a panel regression
with industry fixed effects:
sjt = αj + β ·Xj,t−1 + εjt (7)
where sjt is the rate of asset sales of industry j from time t − 1 to t and Xjt−1
includes all lagged controlled variables for industry j.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2004) find that more assets are traded when the
industry experiences positive demand shocks, and that multi-segment firms are more
likely to acquire assets compared to their single-segment counterparts. Andrade and
Stafford (2004) show that mergers also help to clean out excess capacity in the down-
turn when capital utilization rate in the industry is low. We control for capital
expenditure (CAPX), asset turnover rate (ATTURN), profitability (OPMARG), in-
dustry sales growth rate (D ECON), size distribution (HERF), and the percentage of
diversified firms in the industry (MPCT).
The results are summarized in Table 5. Panel A shows how rates of asset sales
differ over the years for a given industry. First, consistent with Andrade and Stafford
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(2004), we find that asset sales are higher in years when new investments are low
and the capital utilization rates are low. Next, similar to Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001), we find that rates of asset sales are significantly higher in expansion years,
when the industry experiences positive sales growth. The size distribution, measured
by the Herfindahl index, has a positive effect: years with higher dispersion, or a lower
Herfindahl index, have higher rates of asset sales. Profitability, on the other hand,
is not a significant factor, and neither is the percentage of diversified firms in the
industry. The F test that examines the group effects reject the null Conjecture that
no significant fixed effect exists across industries.
In the second step, after obtaining the estimated industry fixed effects bαj from
(7), which captures the pure industry effect of asset sales, we regress it on shock
attributes:
bαj = β0 + β1ρj + β2σj + εj (8)
Panel B shows the results from the second-step regression. Consistent with the
results from the mean regression earlier, industries with less persistent and widely
dispersed productivity shocks have significantly more asset transfers across firms
(β1 < 0 and β2 > 0). Together, these factors, persistence and dispersion, explain
about 16 percent of the total variation in the estimated industry fixed effects.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
To summarize, the results found in this section from univariate analysis, mean
regressions and panel regressions, are consistent with Conjecture 2 that attributes
of productivity shocks explain the cross-industry variation in asset sales. Industries
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with lower persistence and higher dispersion in productivity shocks have higher rates
of asset reallocation.
4.3 Time-Series Variation in Asset Sales
The persistence and dispersion of productivity shocks measure the intrinsic uncer-
tainty firms face due to the nature of the industry. Both proxies are estimated using
time-series data of more than 20 years. Although they help to explain why some
industries on average have more trades in existing assets, they are not able to explain
how uncertainty affects asset sales over time within a given industry.
In this section, we develop a time-variant measure that approximates the contem-
poraneous uncertainty within the industry, and examine how it is related to rates of
asset sales over time.
4.3.1 Estimation of the Uncertainty
Since our key focus here is to capture the uncertainty related to changes in firms’ rela-
tive positions within the industry, we develop our proxy of uncertainty as a correlation
measure using the following specification:
γjt = corr
©
pct (dzij,t) , pct ¡\zij,t−1¢ª (9)
where pct (dzij,t) and pct ¡\zij,t−1¢ are the percentiles of the estimated idiosyncratic
productivity of plant i in industry j at time t, and at time t − 1, respectively. The
dzij,t0s are estimated based on (1).
The uncertainty measure, γ, captures the likelihood that a plant stays at its po-
sition in the industry. A high γ corresponds to a low level of uncertainty. We use
68
percentiles instead of the raw values of productivity here so that our result is not
affected by changes in distribution of productivity. When calculating γ, we exclude
plants that change ownership between the period of t − 1 and t because ownership
changes are exogenous events that may bring dramatic changes to a plant’s produc-
tivity.22
Conjecture 3 above predicts that within an industry, years with more shuffling in
relative positions and high uncertainty have higher rates of asset sales. We test this
effect in this section.
4.3.2 Univariate Tests
Our sample has an unbalanced panel of 112 industries and 2647 industry-years based
on three-digit SIC codes in the period of 1973 - 2000. The uncertainty measure γ,
has a mean of 66 percent, and a standard deviation of 11 percent.
First, we divide our sample into four groups, each with an equal number of ob-
servations based on the uncertainty measure, γ. High γ means that uncertainty is
low.
Table 6 Panel A shows the average rate of asset sales in all γ−groups. Panel B
tests the differences in asset sales between the 1st quartile (Low-γ group) and the
last quartile (High-γ group) of γ groups. The High-γ (low uncertainty) group has
an asset sales rate of 3.7 percent, compared to a rate of 4.4 percent in the Low-γ
(high uncertainty) group. Both T-test and the Mann-Whitney rank test suggest that
uncertainty within the industry matters for asset sales - firm-years of low γ, or high
uncertainty, have more frequent asset transfers.
22The results are very similar when all the plants are used to calculate γjt.
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[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
4.3.3 Multivariate Tests
To find out how shuffling of productivity in an industry affects the amount of assets
traded over time, we estimate a panel regression with industry fixed effects based on
the following specification:
sjt = αj + β1γj,t + β2Xj,t−1 + εjt (10)
where sjt is the rate of asset sales of industry j at time t; γj,t measures the uncertainty
in industry j from time t − 1 to time t, using (9); and Xjt−1 includes all lagged
controlled variables of industry j.
We estimate γj,t only using plants that do not have ownership transfer to avoid
potential endogeneity problems. For control variables, we include capital expenditure
(CAPX), profitability (OPMARG), rate of sales (D ECON), size distribution (HERF)
and the percentage of diversified firms in the industry (MPCT). We also include the
standard deviation of productivity distribution (I DISP) as a control variable to test
how productivity dispersion affects asset sales. Again, to avoid potential endogeneity
problem, we only use plants that do not change ownership during the time period for
our calculation of the dispersion.
This specification is different from (7) and (8). The uncertainty measure, γ, is
estimated to be time-variant. While (7) and (8) focus on how intrinsic uncertainty
of an industry affects the average rate of asset sales, the specification in (10) tests
whether changes of uncertainty over time have an impact on asset sales activity in a
given industry.
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The results are shown in Table 7. There exists a significant relationship between
industry uncertainty and rate of asset sales. Within an industry, years with high
uncertainty (or low γ) have much higher asset sales. For example, the rate of asset
sales is at xxx percent when the uncertainty is at its 90th percentile (or 10th percentile
of γ), whereas it is only xxx percent when the uncertainty is at its 10th percentile (or
90th percentile of γ). Our findings here support Conjecture 3 that within an industry,
time periods with more uncertainty have higher rates of asset sales.
More asset sales also occur in years when new investment is low and the capital
utilization is low. Assets are more likely to be traded when demand is high and the
industry is in expansion. A higher percentage of multi-segment firms in the industry
contributes to a higher rate of asset sales, consistent with our earlier finding that
multi-segment firms are more likely to participate in asset purchases and sales. The
productivity dispersion, however, does not have a significant effect on asset sales.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
4.3.4 Uncertainty and Capital Expenditure
For firms that pursue expansion, capital expenditure and asset purchase serve as
alternative means. Yang (2005) suggests that given a positive shock, firms are more
likely to buy assets when shocks are transitory, and that investing in new assets is
more preferable when shocks are persistent. This is because higher persistence makes
the current position more likely to stay, and therefore lower the risk from getting the
capacity in the next period through new investments.
Table 8 shows how uncertainty in the industry affects the rate of capital expendi-
ture. Consistent with the model developed in Yang (2005), we find that there exists
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a significant negative relationship between industry uncertainty and capital expen-
diture. Firms invest more in new assets in periods with less uncertainty (or high
γ).
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
The finding here on the relation among uncertainty, asset purchases and sales, and
capital expenditure offer preliminary insights on how firms choose between internal
and external growth for expansion, and how uncertainty regarding firms’ relative
positions may affect the investment patterns in an industry.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze how changes in productivity affect firms’ decision to trade
assets, and what it implies for asset sales activity in the industry over time. We
find that the pattern of transactions (firm-level purchase/sale decisions, and cross-
industry and time-series variation in industry-level asset sales activity) are consistent
with the model developed in Yang (2005).
Using the plant-level data from Longitudinal Research Database on manufacturing
firms in the period of 1973 to 2000, we find three main results:
1. Asset purchases are more likely when firms’ existing plants experience increases
in productivity, and asset sales are more likely when firms have decreases in
productivity (“rising buys falling”)
2. Shock attributes such as persistence and dispersion help to explain the cross-
industry difference in asset reallocation - industries with less persistent and
more widely dispersed productivity shocks have greater assets sales on average.
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Together, persistence and Dispersion explain about 16 percent of the industry
fixed effect in asset sales.
3. Within the industry, periods with more shuffling regarding firms’ relative po-
sition in productivity are associated with more frequent reallocation. A xx
percent increase in industry uncertainty leads to a xx percent increase in the
amount of assets traded.
These findings suggest that firms optimally adjust their capacity in response to




Table 1: Probability of Asset Purchase
This table reports estimation results on the probability of asset purchases using a Probit
model based on (3). The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of
1 if a firm segment buys assets in the current period and 0 otherwise. Productivities are
caluclated based on (1). D MULTI is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm
has more than one segment and 0 otherwise. D MAIN is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if it is the main segment. CAPX is the capital expenditure ratio. OPMARG is
the operational margin, measured as a ratio of earnings divided by sales. SIZE measures the
total value of shipments in the segment. ATTURN is the asset turnover ratio, measured as
sales divided by asset size. D ECON is a dummy variable that equals to one if the industry-
level sales increase for two consecutive years, minus one if sales decrease for two consecutive
years and zero otherwise. I OPMARG is the average industry operational margin. I γ
measures the uncertainty in the industry from (9) and I DISP is the standard deviation of
productivity distribution. All the control variables are lagged. z-statistics are reported in
parentheses and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Dependent variable: Probability of Asset Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Productivity 0.001 0.030 0.145 ***
(0.05) (1.24) (5.73)
Change of Productivity 0.084 *** 0.094 *** 0.107 ***
(3.61) (3.82) (4.25)
D MULTI 0.729 *** 0.742 *** 0.742 *** 0.746 ***
(61.78) (62.07) (62.01) (59.45)
D MAIN 0.100 *** 0.112 *** 0.111 *** 0.077 ***
(8.82) (9.7) (9.69) (6.45)
CAPX -0.028 -0.022 -0.023 0.028
(−1.53) (−1.19) (−1.22) (1.47)
OPMARG 0.342 *** 0.380 *** 0.356 *** 0.304 ***
(10.46) (14.15) (10.68) (8.85)
SIZE (x 106) 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 ***
(9.19) (9.18) (9.04) (7.96)
ATTURN -0.010 ***
(−13.42)
D ECON 0.045 *** 0.045 *** 0.045 *** 0.020 ***
(6.86) (6.78) (6.80) (2.77)
I OPMARG 1.017 *** 0.961 *** 0.989 *** 2.086 ***
(13.86) (13.51) (13.26) (9.99)
I γ -0.310 ***
(−4.85)
I DISP 0.277 ***
(3.06)
Constant -2.709 *** -2.741 *** -2.740 *** -2.198 ***
(−176.56) (−176.10) (−175.99) (−39.62)
w/ fixed effect
Psedo R-square 7.9% 8.1% 8.1% 10.3%
Number of Obs. 485,717 485,427 485,427 485,427
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Table 2: Probability of Asset Sales
This table reports estimation results on the probability of asset sales using a Probit model
based on (4). The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm
segment sells assets in the next period and 0 otherwise. Productivities are caluclated based
on (1). D MULTI is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has more than
one segment and 0 otherwise. D MAIN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it
is the main segment. CAPX is the capital expenditure ratio. OPMARG is the operational
margin, measured as a ratio of earnings divided by sales. SIZE measures the total value of
shipments in the segment. ATTURN is the asset turnover ratio, measured as sales divided
by asset size. D ECON is a dummy variable that equals to one if the industry-level sales
increase for two consecutive years, minus one if sales decrease for two consecutive years and
zero otherwise. I OPMARG is the average industry operational margin. I γ measures the
uncertainty in the industry from (9) and I DISP is the standard deviation of productivity
distribution. All the control variables are lagged. z-statistics are reported in parentheses
and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Dependent variable: Probability of Asset Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current Productivity -0.048 ***
(−3.52)
Change of Productivity -0.040 *** -0.064 *** -0.072 ***
(−3.01) (−3.95) (−4.34)
Lagged Productivity -0.038 *** -0.049 ***
(−2.6) (−3.24)
D MULTI 0.336 *** 0.335 *** 0.336 *** 0.321 ***
(40.75) (40.70) (40.77) (37.63)
D MAIN -0.146 *** -0.148 *** -0.147 *** -0.161 ***
(−16.54) (−16.68) (−16.64) (−17.77)
ATTURN -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(−7.07) (−7.23) (−6.85) (−4.97)
CAPX -0.182 *** -0.187 *** -0.186 *** -0.166 ***
(−15.28) (−15.59) (−15.44) (−13.57)
OPMARG 0.107 *** 0.081 *** 0.108 *** 0.120 ***
(5.66) (5.11) (5.69) (6.12)
SIZE (x 106) 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.009 ***
(5.07) (4.86) (5.01) (5.65)
D ECON 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** -0.001
(2.8) (2.85) (2.81) (−0.11)
I OPMARG 0.692 *** 0.725 *** 0.692 *** 1.705 ***
(14.79) (16.01) (14.72) (12.82)




Constant -1.812 *** -1.809 *** -1.810 *** -1.420 ***
-173.53 -173.14 -173 -(40.05)
w/ fixed effect
Pseudo R-square 3.26% 3.28% 3.29% 3.79%
Number of Obs. 625,933 622,601 622,601 597,508
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Table 3: Shock Persistence, Dispersion and Asset Sales
This table reports the test results from comparing average assets sales between High-ρ and
Low-ρ industries, and between High-σ and Low-σ industries, respectively. We form groups
such that the High-group consists of observations in the top 33 percentile, the Low-group
consists of observations in the bottom 33 percentile and the Medium-group consists of all
observations in between. For each year, we measure the asset sales rate as the number of
plants that change ownership divided by the total number of the plants in the industry.
p-values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Shock Persistence (ρ) and Asset Sales
# of Obs Mean(ρ) Mean Std. Dev.
Low - ρ 38 0.56 4.22% 0.90%
High - ρ 37 0.70 3.80% 0.83%
T Test 2.11 (3.81)
Signed Rank Test 1.62 (10%)
Spearman Correlation −0.20 (8%)
Kendall’s Tau −0.15 (6%)
Panel B: Shock Volatility (σ) and Asset Sales
# of Obs Mean(σ) Mean Std. Dev.
Low - σ 38 0.15 3.67% 0.78%
High- σ 37 0.30 4.01% 0.88%
T Test −1.78 (8%)
Signed Rank Test −1.66 (10%)
Spearman Correlation 0.24 (4%)
Kendall’s Tau 0.15 (5%)
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Table 4: Persistence, Dispersion and Asset Sales: Mean Regression
This table reports regression results on the average asset sales rate based on (6). For each
year, we measure the asset sales rate as the number of plants that change ownership dividing
by the total number of plants in the industry. CAPX is the average capital expenditure ratio.
ATTURN is the average asset turnover ratio, measured as a ratio of total sales divided by
total assets. OPMARG is the average operational margin, measured as a ratio of earnings
divided by sales. ECON measures the percentage of expansion years over the total industry
years. We define a year as an expansion year if it has positive sales growth rates for two
consecutive years. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Average Asset Sales Rate (in percentage)
(1) (2) (3)
Shock Persistence (ρ) −3.26∗∗∗ −2.31∗∗∗
(-2.94) (-2.01)
Shock Dispersion (σ) 3.69∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗
(3.30) (2.49)
CAPX −2.50 −7.80∗ −5.77∗
(-0.62) (-1.89) (-1.38)
ATTURN −0.55∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗
(-2.93) (-2.53) (-2.78)
OPMARG 4.25∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗
(3.94) (3.70) (4.02)
ECON 0.60∗ 0.49 0.55
(1.53) (1.27) (1.43)
CONS 6.86∗∗∗ 4.82∗∗∗ 6.13∗∗∗
(8.16) (8.21) (7.03)
# of Obs. 112 112 112
Adj. R2 25% 26% 28%
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Table 5: Persistence, Dispersion and Industry Fixed Effect of Asset Sales
This table reports the regression results on industry’s fixed effects of asset sales based on (7)
and (8). Panel A shows estimation results of a fixed-effect model in which the dependent
variable is the annual asset sales rate in an industry. For each year, the asset sales rate
is measured as a ratio of the number of plants that change ownership divided by the total
number of plants. CAPX is the capital expenditure ratio. ATTURN is the asset turnover
ratio, measured as a ratio of total sales divided by total assets. OPMARG is the operational
margin, measured as a ratio of earnings divided by sales. D ECON is a dummy variable
that equals to one if the industry-level sales increase for two consecutive years, minus one
if sales decrease for two consecutive years and zero otherwise. HERF is the Herfindahl
Index based on sizes. MPCT is the percentage of plants in the industry that are owned by
multi-segment firms. All explanatory variables are lagged. Panel B shows the regression
results using the estimated industry fixed effect of asset sales as the dependent variable. In
both panels, t-statistics are reported in parentheses and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent a significance
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Panel Regression




















Dependent Variable: Industry Fixed-effects of Asset Sales
Shock Persistence (ρ) −1.93∗∗∗
(-7.07)




# of Obs. 112
R2 16.35%
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Table 6: Uncertainty and Asset Sales: Univariate Analysis
This table reports the test results from comparing average assets sales between High- and
Low-γ industry-years. Uncertainty measure, γ, is estimated using (9). We form four groups
based on γ such that each group has the same number of observations. Group 1 contains
the industry-years with the lowest γ, and Group 4 includes industry-years with the highest
γ. Panel A reports the mean of γ and the average rate of asset sales in each γ-group.
Panel B reports the test results when comparing the rate of asset sales between group 1
and group 4. For each year, we measure the asset sales rate as the number of plants that
change ownership divided by the total number of the plants in the industry. p-values are
reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Uncertainty and Asset Sales
Quartiles based on γ # of Obs Mean (γ) Mean (Asset Sales Rate)
1 (low γ) 753 0.528 4.41%
2 753 0.646 4.02%
3 753 0.707 3.91%
4 (high γ) 752 0.781 3.71%
Panel B: Compare Rate of Asset Sales between Groups
# of Obs Mean (Asset Sales Rate)
Low - γ 753 4.41%
High - γ 752 3.71%
T Test t = 4.7519
(p = 0.00%)
Rank Test z = 4.644
(p = 0.00%)
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Table 7: Uncertainty and Asset Sales - Panel Regression
This table reports the regression results using the panel data based on (10). The dependent
variable is the annual rate of asset sales in an industry. For each year, the asset sales rate
is measured as a ratio of the number of plants that change ownership divided by the total
number of plants. I γ measures the uncertainty in the industry based on (9) and I DISP
is the standard deviation of productivity distribution. CAPX is the capital expenditure
ratio. OPMARG is the operational margin, measured as a ratio of earnings divided by
sales. HERF is the Herfindahl Index based on sizes. MPCT is the percentage of plants in
the industry that are owned by multisegment firms. D ECON is a dummy variable that
equals to one if the industry-level sales increase for two consecutive years, minus one if sales
decrease for two consecutive years and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables are lagged.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent a significance level of 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
Dependent variable: Rate of Asset Sales (in percentage)
(1) (2)








HERF −7.099 ** −7.472 **
(−2.21) (−2.29)
MPCT −1.276 * −1.312 *
(−1.85) (−1.89)
D ECON 0.222 ** 0.225 **
(2.53) (2.56)
I γ * D ECON 0.064 0.063
(0.50) (0.50)
Constant 8.370 *** 8.284 ***
(16.62) (15.92)
F-stat 2.48 2.47
Adjust R-square 13% 13%
Number of Obs 2674 2674
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Table 8: Uncertainty and Capital Expenditure: Panel Regression
This table reports the regression results using the panel data. The dependent variable is
the annual rate of capital expenditure in an industry. For each year, the asset sales rate
is measured as a ratio of the number of plants that change ownership divided by the total
number of plants. I γ measures the uncertainty in the industry based on (9) and I DISP
is the standard deviation of productivity distribution. CAPX is the capital expenditure
ratio. OPMARG is the operational margin, measured as a ratio of earnings divided by
sales. HERF is the Herfindahl Index based on sizes. MPCT is the percentage of plants in
the industry that are owned by multisegment firms. D ECON is a dummy variable that
equals to one if the industry-level sales increase for two consecutive years, minus one if sales
decrease for two consecutive years and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables are lagged.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent a significance level of 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
Dependent variable: Rate of Capital Expenditure (in percentage)
(1) (2)
I γ 5.048 *** 4.591 ***
(4.85) (4.32)
I DISP 3.921 **
(2.14)
Asset Sales −33.111 *** −33.193 ***
(−9.17) (−9.19)
OPMARG 36.228 *** 34.417 ***
(11.03) (10.16)
HERF −12.825 ** −14.956 **
(−2.24) (−2.57)
MPCT 4.267 *** 4.031 ***
(3.50) (3.30)
D ECON 0.264 * 0.281 *
(1.70) (1.81)
I γ * D ECON 1.356 *** 1.353 ***
(5.99) (5.98)
Constant 10.424 *** 9.918 ***
(11.00) (10.16)
F-stat 5.67 5.47
Adjust R-square 0.2859 0.2869
Number of Obs 2674 2674
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Appendix of Essay 1
Appendix 1: Two-Firm Example
I solve the model from backwards.
• At t=1

























¢α−1 − P 1 + β (1− δ) = 0
With the market clearing condition x11 (P
1) + x12 (P









¢− k11 if f ≤ G1 (A2)
x11 = −x12 = 0 if f > G1
















1−α + β (1− δ) (A3)
if x11 6= 0














´ is the share of total capital for firm 1 and G1 =
min {[π (k1i + x1i , A1i )− π (k1i , A1i )]− [P 1 − β (1− δ)]x11}2i=1 is the minimum gain from
transaction across two firms.
• At t=0



















¢− ¡P 0xx0i + f + Ii¢+ βEV 1 ¡k1i , z1a, z1i ¢ (A4)
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¢α−1 − P 0 + β (1− δ) ∂EV 1
∂k1i
= 0 (A5)




With market clearing condition x01 (P
0) + x02 (P






¡¡{Ii}2i=1¢¢ and equilibrium price (P 0).





¢− k01 if f ≤ G0 (A6)






− β (1− δ)
! 1
1−α £
z0a (2πa − 1) + z0i (2πi − 1)
¤− (1− δ) ¡k0i + x0i ¢ (A7)
















1−α + (1− δ)βEP 1∗ (A8)
if x01 6= 0














´ is the total share of existing capital for firm 1
and G0 = min {[π (k0i + x0i , A0i )− π (k0i , A0i )]− [P 0 − β (1− δ)]x01}2i=1 is the minimum
gain from transaction across two firms.
The expected future price for existing asset depends on current aggregate produc-
tivity and whether the constraints on investment are binding
βEP 1 = 1− µ1 if Ii = 0 (A9)
= 1 if Ii > 0
where µ1 is the Lagrangian multipliers for the non-negativity restriction that Ii ≥
0.
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(1− δ) ¡k01 + k02¢+ (I1 + I2)¤− £(1− δ) θ0 ¡k01 + k02¢+ I01¤
= (1− δ) ¡k01 + k02¢ ¡θ1 − θ0¢+µθ1 − I1I1 + I2
¶
(I1 + I2)



































= θ0 if z (2πi − 1) =
¡
2θ0 − 1¢ za (2πa − 1)
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Appendix 2: Proofs of Proporsitions
Proposition 1 Let θ denote the share of total assets that the firm with a pos-








and is increasing in shock
magnitude such that ∂θ
∂z
> 0.
























































¢ = θ (A13)












































Proposition 2 (1) Given the fixed cost and shock magnitude, sales are more
likely to occur when aggregate productivity is high. (2) Given the aggregate produc-
tivity, the likelihood of asset sales decreases as fixed cost increases.
Proof. Assume that firms start with equal sizes, k01 = k
0
2 = k. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that z0 = z > 0, i.e., Firm 1 has the higher idiosyncratic productivity




= θ · 2k − k (A15)¡
k + x02
¢
= (1− θ) 2k
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Sales will occur if the minimum gain from the transaction, G0, if greater than the
fixed transaction cost, f . Therefore, the probability of having sales occur increases
in G0.
From the derivation, G0 = min {[π (k0i + x0i , A0i )− π (k0i , A0i )]− [P 0 − β (1− δ)]x01}2i=1





[(2θk)α − kα]| {z }
marginal increase in production
− α exp ¡z0a + z¢µ 12θk
¶1−α
(2θk − k)| {z }





[(k)α − (2 (1− θ) k)α]| {z }







(2θk − k)| {z }
proceeds from the sale (net of resale value)
Since 0 < G01 < G
0
2, we have G
0 = min {G01, G02} = G01


















(2θ)α (1− α)− 1 + α
(2θ)1−α
¸
= G0 > 0 (A16)
i.e., sales are more likely to occur when aggregate productivity (za) is high.
The threshold level of aggregate shock, za satisfies G
0 (za) = f :










i.e., given the aggregate shock (za), sales are more likely when fixed cost is low.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique function V (k, zi; za, k) : K ×ZI ×ZA×
K → R+, that solves the dynamic program in (18), and generates unique optimal
policy functions I(k, zi; za, k) and x(k, zi; za, k).









Since both shocks follow AR (1) process and 0 < ρa < 1 and 0 < ρi < 1, shocks
are monotone.
The maximum allowable capital stock kmax is then determined by
exp(za + zi)π







Since k > k is not economically profit, let
K ≡ [0, kmax]
By definition, K is compact and non-empty. Therefore,the set for mean of k,
K is also compact and non-empty, K ≡ [0, kmax]. The production function π (.) is
continuous and concave such that π0 > 0 and π00 < 0 The discount rate, 0 < β < 1
Therefore, it satisfies the condition (1) - (3) in Adda and Cooper (2004), and by
Theorem 3 in Cooper and Russell (2004), there exists a unique continuous function V:
K ×ZI ×ZA×K → R+ that solves (18) and there exists stationary policy functions
I(k, zi; za, k) and x(k, zi; za, k).
Q.E.D.
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Appendix 3: Computation of Approximate Equilibrium
The steps below outline my computation strategy for approximate equilibrium:
• Step1
Guess an initial law of motionH0 with coefficients {a0, a1, b0, b1} and initial pric-
ing function identified as {c0, c1, d0, d1} Solve problem (25), for value function
V (ki, zi; za, k), and decision rules x(ki, zi; za, k) and I(ki, zi; za, k)
• Step 2
Use value function derived from Step 1 and a given price grid, P , to solve the
following problem:
eV (ki, zi; za, k, P ) = max
0 ≤Ii ≤ I × ki
qi ≥ −ki
π (ki + xi, Ai)−
"
Ii + Pxxi +
P
j∈{I,,x}











Assume that future price will evolve based on the perceived pricing function.
Derive for value function eV (k, zi; za, k, P ) and decision rules ex(ki, zi; za, k, P )
and eI(ki, zi; za, k, P ).
• Step 3
(i) Fix an initial capacity/idiosyncratic shock distribution for a large number of
firms F 0 = {k0i , z0i }Ni=1 , and pick an initial aggregate shock level {z0a}. Simulate
firms’ decisions using the decision rules derived in Step 2. Find the price level
(P 0) , at which market clears.
(ii) Derive the optimal decisions on asset sales x0i and new investment, I
0
i using
the price P 0 and the decision rules ex(ki, zi; za, k, P ) and eI(ki, zi; za, k, P ).
(iii) Capacity in the next period {k1i }Ni=1 can be calculated using k1i = (1− δ) (k0i + x0i )+







Generate idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks for the next period, following
AR(1) using (ρa, σa, ρi, σi)
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for each value of za to get the realized law of motionbH and realized pricing function bP Compare the perceived law of motion H0 and
perceived pricing function P 0 with the realized law of motion bH and realized
pricing function bP . If different, use new coefficients ³ba0, ba1, bb0, bb1, bc0, bc1, bd0, bd1´
to construct initial guess, return to Step1, and iterate until convergence.23
23Convergence is achieved if the norm of the difference in coefficients divided by the norm of the
initial coefficients is less than 1%.
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